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DARK MATTER IN THE LAW 
D. CAROLINA NÚÑEZ* 
Abstract: Not all law is written down. Sometimes, informal norms and expecta-
tions about what the law is or ought to be constrain behavior. Lawyers and legal 
commentators instinctively understand this concept and have written about it, but 
none have discussed the interaction or relationship between these unwritten 
norms—which I refer to as law’s “dark matter”—and traditional formal law, like 
case law and statutes—which I refer to as law’s “ordinary matter.” I venture into 
this overlooked relationship to reveal a fascinating and important dynamic that 
shapes the development of law. In this Article, I explore law’s dark matter by ob-
serving its effect on law’s ordinary matter. I focus on the interaction between 
dark matter and court precedent, and I show how dark matter can play a signifi-
cant, and even primary, role in shaping behavior despite the existence of contrary 
precedent in the field. I illustrate this curious phenomenon primarily with refer-
ence to The Chinese Exclusion Case, an 1889 Supreme Court decision that re-
mains formally “on the books” but seems inimical to modern conceptions of con-
stitutional law. I also briefly examine Korematsu v. United States, Buck v. Bell, 
and their interaction with subsequently developed dark matter. From my exami-
nation of these cases and their subsequent treatment by legal actors, I argue that, 
counterintuitively, dark matter can weaken ordinary matter—formal law—while 
at the same time insulating that ordinary matter from review and possible rescis-
sion. I identify three factors that can lead to the development of dark matter with 
this effect. I also posit that dark matter has more influence on legislative bodies 
and courts than on the executive branch, and I examine the implications of this 
discrepancy in dark matter’s power. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Republican front-runner Donald 
Trump brought what had once been squarely within the realm of far-fetched 
law school exam hypotheticals into a very real national spotlight. In urging the 
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United States to bar the entry of Muslims,1 then-candidate Trump sparked dis-
cussions among scholars and other commentators about the constitutionality of 
such a bar.2 As President, Trump ultimately signed an executive order that did 
not explicitly mention religion and therefore narrowly skirted the constitutional 
question that had sparked debate.3 But the memory of the original Trump pro-
posal lingers and raises difficult questions about the Constitution and immigra-
tion law. 
After all, under ordinary constitutional analysis, excluding individuals 
from a government-provided right or benefit based on religion almost certainly 
violates the Constitution.4 But immigration law is anything but ordinary. 
Though the United States has never passed a law or implemented a policy ex-
plicitly prohibiting the entry of members of a religion, it does have a history of 
prohibiting or limiting entry based on race and national origin. In fact, Presi-
dent Trump’s original proposal sounded eerily similar to an 1888 law barring, 
with few exceptions, the entry of Chinese immigrants into the United States.5 
In a subsequent extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act, as it became known, 
Congress went so far as to prohibit legal permanent residents of Chinese de-
scent from returning to the United States.6 In doing so, Congress made obvious 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Reid J. Epstein & Peter Nicholas, Donald Trump Calls for Ban on Muslim Entry into U.S., 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-calls-for-ban-on-muslim-
entry-into-u-s-1449526104 [https://perma.cc/G69T-AA33]; Patrick Healy & Michael Barbaro, Donald 
Trump Calls for Barring Muslims from Entering U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.ny
times.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-banning-muslims-from-entering-u-s/ 
[https://perma.cc/PN7X-97L5]; Jenna Johnson & David Weigel, Donald Trump Calls for ‘Total’ Ban 
on Muslims Entering United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2015/12/07/e56266f6-9d2b-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html [https://perma.cc/SH37-
8MQR]. 
 2 Compare Peter J. Spiro, Opinion, Trump’s Anti-Muslim Plan Is Awful. And Constitutional., 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/trumps-anti-muslim-plan-
is-awful-and-constitutional.html [https://perma.cc/WB7B-NFSG], and Eric Posner, Is an Immigration 
Ban on Muslims Unconstitutional?, ERICPOSNER.COM (Dec. 8, 2015), http://ericposner.com/is-an-
immigration-ban-on-muslims-unconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/8MUX-A477], with Ivan Eland, 
Trump’s Ban on Muslims Is Unconstitutional and Obscures Real Solution, HUFFPOST (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trumps-ban-on-muslims-is_b_8804284 [https://perma.cc/D6AR-N8H7]. 
 3 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417, 2420–21 (2018); Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 4 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (barring Congress from passing any “law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”). 
 5 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (repealed 1943) (declaring that the “coming of 
Chinese laborers to the United States . . . is hereby, suspended”). 
 6 Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (Oct. 1, 1888) (repealed 1943). The effects of this legislation 
were significant. In 1882, before the effective date of the Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, commonly 
known as the Chinese Exclusion Act, over 39,000 Chinese immigrants entered the U.S. In 1887, after 
the effective date, only ten entered. ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DUR-
ING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943, at 43–44 (2003); Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong 
Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 8 (David A. Martin & Peter H. 
Schuck eds., 2005). 
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that race was its motivating factor and left long-time U.S. residents of Chinese 
nationality stranded abroad with no way to return home. 
The parallels between the original Trump proposal and the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act are significant, and the implications of those parallels are perplex-
ing. After all, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Chinese Exclusion 
Act and its subsequent extensions in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The 
Chinese Exclusion Case) in 1889.7 And that case has never been overturned. 
Rather, the very foundations of immigration law rest on the Court’s century-
old pronouncements in that case.8 By its own terms, The Chinese Exclusion 
Case established nearly unbridled federal power—“plenary power”—over 
immigration law.9 The plenary power doctrine articulated in this case and its 
progeny appears to allow Congress to act outside the constitutional norms that 
ordinarily restrain its lawmaking power. But how far outside of those norms 
may Congress act? Could Congress re-enact a ban on the entry of Chinese na-
tionals or—more relevant to recent history—prohibit the entry of Muslims or 
Central Americans into the country today? Is the Court’s holding in The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case an immortal blank check for Congress, or, for that matter, 
the President? 
Since the era of Chinese exclusion, the Court has never had an opportuni-
ty to again address a categorical bar on entry so blatantly based on criteria now 
heavily scrutinized under the law. Never again has Congress categorically 
barred individuals from entry based on race or national origin. And Congress 
has never barred individuals from entry based on religion. But the Court has 
reaffirmed the broad plenary power established in The Chinese Exclusion Case 
to uphold other legislation that would be held unconstitutional if applied to 
citizens in the United States. Indeed, “[the] Court has repeatedly emphasized 
that ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”10 Plenary power has insulat-
ed Congress’s immigration-related laws from substantive and procedural due 
process,11 equal protection,12 First Amendment,13 and Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                           
 7 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (declaring “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners . . . an incident of 
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution”). 
 8 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 
346–48 (2008) (surveying the impact that the Supreme Court’s 1889 case Chae Chin Ping v. United 
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case) had on immigration law); David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s 
Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 30 (2015) (noting that The Chinese Exclusion 
Case “is traditionally taken as the fountainhead of the plenary power doctrine”). 
 9 Martin, supra note 8, at 30. 
 10 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (holding that the 
Attorney General may refuse to allow foreigners to enter the United States). 
 11 See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 U. 
CONN. L. REV. 879, 895–99 (2015) (contending that the plenary power doctrine hindered the expan-
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norms.14 Although the scope of plenary power has certainly eroded over time, 
it continues to exist today (to the dismay of numerous immigration law schol-
ars and commentators15). 
And so The Chinese Exclusion Case lives on. It is the existing foundation 
of over a century of immigration plenary power decisions and an institutional 
expression of xenophobia that seems inimical to basic constitutional ideals to-
day. It is both the baby that grew into full-grown (if often criticized) plenary 
power and the bathwater that incubated it. Scholars and commentators are left 
with the uneasy task of distinguishing between the two. It is no wonder, then, 
that scholars disagree on the contours of plenary power today. Should Con-
gress ever choose to bar the entry of Muslims, The Chinese Exclusion Case 
would be the most factually similar precedent for Supreme Court review. Does 
that fact mean President Trump’s original proposal to bar the entry of Muslims 
was constitutional? Some immigration and constitutional law scholars have 
concluded that, albeit reprehensible, President Trump’s original proposal might 
indeed be constitutional.16 Others have cited to the erosion of the plenary pow-
er doctrine in more recent Supreme Court opinions to conclude that the Court 
                                                                                                                           
sion of due process protections in the immigration context); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolu-
tion of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1625, 1628 (1992) (noting that the plenary power doctrine has limited the effectiveness of due 
process challenges to immigration laws and regulations); Ozan O. Varol, Note, Substantive Due Pro-
cess, Plenary-Power Doctrine, and Minimum Contacts: Arguments for Overcoming the Obstacle of 
Asserting Personal Jurisdiction Over Terrorists Under the Anti-terrorism Act, 92 IOWA L. REV. 297, 
321 (2006) (asserting that the plenary power doctrine leaves foreigners with lesser constitutional pro-
tections than United States citizens). 
 12 See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 791, 799–800 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a law 
providing preferential immigration status to illegitimate children and their mothers, while excluding 
illegitimate children and their fathers); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101, 103–04 (1976) 
(noting that the plenary power doctrine allows the government in certain instances to treat non-citizens 
differently than citizens, though cautioning that the government cannot do so arbitrarily); Gabriel J. 
Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigra-
tion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (contending that immigration law is one of the last remaining areas 
where racial classifications still trigger little judicial scrutiny); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Member-
ship: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 714 (1996) (noting that non-
citizens enjoy greater constitutional protections outside the immigration law context). 
 13 See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532–33 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
statute banning naturalization for Communist party members violates the First Amendment); Harisia-
des v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952). 
 14 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 744–61 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the deportation procedure constitutes an unreasonable seizure of person under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 15 See, e.g., Chin, supra note 12, at 15 (analogizing the doctrine’s staying power to “baseball’s 
antitrust exemption” because both benefit from “almost a century of precedent” (quoting Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 
255, 291)); Robert Pauw, Plenary Power: An Outmoded Doctrine That Should Not Limit IIRIRA Re-
form, 51 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1114 (2002) (arguing that “the governmental interest in controlling immi-
gration should not necessarily always trump the fundamental family rights at stake”). 
 16 Spiro, supra note 2. 
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might potentially invalidate any attempt to bar entry based on religion.17 Be-
cause President Trump’s final executive order did not explicitly mention reli-
gion, the Supreme Court’s 2018 opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, which addressed 
Hawaii’s claim that the travel ban was unconstitutional, offered little guidance 
on the core question.18 
The traditional analysis of the plenary power doctrine examines and de-
constructs plenary power cases to find evidence of plenary power’s contours. 
This, of course, is useful analysis. If it is indeed a court’s job to say what the 
law is, then examining what a court has said is a pretty good measure of the 
law. But that analysis has its shortcomings. What if the particular question at 
issue has not been asked in a long time and the only relevant precedent on the 
question, though still technically good law, seems wrong somehow? Such is 
the case in the realm of plenary power. There is too little data to fully illumi-
nate the extent and limits of plenary power, particularly as it relates to categor-
ical exclusion based on race or religion. The only precedent we have is The 
Chinese Exclusion Case. 
There is, however, another piece of the puzzle that is worth exploring. 
Plenary power’s limits cannot be defined by studying precedent in a vacuum; 
rather, its contours are also a function of law’s “dark matter”—the substance 
that occupies the void between precedents and statutes. In the century since 
The Chinese Exclusion Case, much has happened, both within the legal world 
and outside it, that is relevant to an evaluation of plenary power’s limits. 
Though it does not fit neatly within a formal conception of law, dark matter 
nonetheless constrains behavior. In the plenary power realm, something has 
constrained Congress from repeating a categorical bar on entry based on race 
or, thus far, from enacting a similar bar based on religion. That same “some-
thing” is what is likely to cause the Supreme Court, should such legislation 
come before it, to invalidate it. But what is law’s dark matter, how do we know 
it is there, and how strong is its pull? 
In physics, the term “dark matter” refers to a substance that, unlike “ordi-
nary matter,” is not directly observable.19 Ordinary matter is quite visible; it is 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Ari Melber, Constitutional Scholars: Trump’s Anti-Muslim Immigration Proposal Is Probably 
Illegal, MSNBC (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-anti-muslim-proposal-probably-
illegal [https://perma.cc/5P8F-KS2C]. 
 18 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (noting that President Trump’s executive order 
was “facially neutral toward religion”); see also Richard A. Dean, Trump v. Hawaii Is Korematsu All 
Over Again, 29 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 175, 184–85 (2019) (claiming that the Court did not consid-
er the purpose behind the regulations and whether it violated the establishment clause); Vicki Lens, 
The Travel Ban Cases: A Tale of Two Governments, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 96 (2019) (suggesting 
that the majority avoided a thorough First Amendment analysis by not considering President Trump’s 
anti-Muslim statements). 
 19 Dark Matter, CERN, https://home.cern/about/physics/dark-matter [https://perma.cc/85ZS-
HJK8] (describing “normal matter,” which I refer to as ordinary matter). 
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the substance that makes galaxies, stars, planets, forests, rocks, and pages of 
law reviews. In short, ordinary matter comprises everything humans encounter 
in their lifetime.20 But ordinary matter is only a small part of the picture. Dark 
matter, though invisible, outnumbers ordinary matter by a factor of five.21 And 
it exerts significant gravitational force and helps form the scaffolding of the 
universe.22 As a result, it is not enough to merely observe the bright objects in 
the universe—stars, galaxies, and planets—however easy they are to find.23 
After all, they are only a small percentage of the universe’s substance.24 An 
accurate understanding of the universe depends on an accounting of dark mat-
ter. Of course, finding something that is invisible to the human eye and to our 
instruments is complicated. To find dark matter, physicists look for its effects—
its gravitational pull on galaxies and its distortion of light, for example.25 
An analogous phenomenon exerts influence on the scope and contours of 
plenary power and, more generally, the law. While the “ordinary matter” of the 
law—statutes, court opinions, regulations, contracts—is certainly an important 
part of the structure of the law, it is not the entire picture. The dark matter of 
law, though harder to observe than the bright stars of formal law, fills in the 
voids. Dark matter helps explain the unsettling nature of cases like The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case—cases that are formally on the books and even play a 
foundational role in a body of law, but give voice to notions long ago rejected 
outside of that particular historical incident.26 
Dark matter is not merely context—it is legal substance. Dark matter is 
not a lens through which to examine precedent or statutes—it is a legitimate 
focus of the lens being applied. Dark matter is not simply information that a 
court may consider in deciding what the law should be—it is part of the very 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Dark Energy, Dark Matter, NASA SCI., https://science.nasa.gov/astrophysics/focus-areas/
what-is-dark-energy [https://perma.cc/6SD6-TUMZ]. 
 21 Id. (estimating that normal matter comprises roughly 5% of the universe and dark matter com-
prises roughly 27% of it). 
 22 Author Summer Brennan has said: 
That’s all regular matter, just five percent. A quarter is “dark matter,” which is invisible 
and detectable only by gravitational pull, and a whopping 70 percent of the universe is 
made up of “dark energy,” described as a cosmic antigravity, as yet totally unknowable. 
It’s basically all mystery out there—all of it, with just this one sliver of knowable, liva-
ble, finite light and life. 
Ethan Siegel, The Biggest Problem with the Expanding Universe Might Be Trouble for Dark Energy 
(Synopsis), SCIENCEBLOGS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://scienceblogs.com/startswithabang/2016/04/12/the-
biggest-problem-with-the-expanding-universe-might-be-trouble-for-dark-energy-synopsis/ [https://
perma.cc/3K9T-HZPZ]; see also Dark Matter, supra note 19. 
 23 See Dark Energy, Dark Matter, supra note 20. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id.; see also Dark Matter, supra note 19. 
 26 See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (rejecting a challenge 
to the Scott Act of 1888 that suspended all immigration from China). 
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substance that courts attempt to describe in pronouncing the law. A description 
of plenary power that fails to account for legal dark matter also fails to accu-
rately describe the shape and extent of plenary power. 
Legal scholars have recognized the existence of what I refer to as dark 
matter in the law. In fact, some have even used this very term. Professor Lau-
rence Tribe has written extensively about “invisible” principles that are con-
sidered binding constitutional law despite being detached from the text of the 
Constitution.27 He even refers to the physical concept of dark matter to illus-
trate his argument.28 Professor Tribe’s work offers a comprehensive approach 
to understanding how formal law later adopted these extra-textual norms 
(which I call “ordinary matter”).29 But the scholarly literature fails to address 
the interaction between dark matter and the ordinary matter of law, particularly 
when they conflict. 
My Article adds an important new claim that is entirely absent from exist-
ing literature: as dark matter accumulates to set a new standard that is in ten-
sion with ordinary matter, the ordinary matter becomes insulated from review. 
I examine the interaction between ordinary matter and conflicting dark matter 
to illuminate this counterintuitive phenomenon. Dark matter contains legal 
norms that constrain behavior in a way that may offset or weaken ordinary 
matter while, at the very same time, insulating that ordinary matter from re-
view and potential modification or rescission. In that sense, long-forgotten or-
dinary matter lurks behind conflicting dark matter, ready to be invoked by a 
non-conformist legal actor. 
Here, my main focus is on Supreme Court precedent and conflicting dark 
matter. I use immigration law’s plenary power doctrine, particularly as it was 
applied in The Chinese Exclusion Case, as the primary vehicle to explore the 
phenomenon of law’s dark matter. But dark matter is not limited to the field of 
immigration law, and so I offer examples outside of immigration law to illus-
trate dark matter’s presence and potential effect in other fields. Indeed, The 
Chinese Exclusion Case is not unique. The 1944 Supreme Court case Kore-
matsu v. United States,30 widely rejected as a stain on American history, imme-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008) (contending that much 
of constitutional law is shaped not by the Constitution’s text itself, but by dark, invisible matter). 
 28 Id. at 22. 
 29 Id.; see CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., MAPPING WASHINGTON’S LAWLESSNESS 2016: A PRELIM-
INARY INVENTORY OF “REGULATORY DARK MATTER” 3 (2015), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/
Wayne%20Crews%20-%20Mapping%20Washington%27s%20Lawlessness.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3KY8-LU8S] (discussing the impact of regulatory dark matter such as internal agency memoranda 
and guidance documents); Michael Steven Green, Law’s Dark Matter, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 
846 (2013) (surveying the continuing impact of dark matter in choice of law decisions). 
 30 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
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diately comes to mind.31 Until Chief Justice Roberts’s recent description of 
Korematsu as “gravely wrong the day it was decided” and “overruled in the 
court of history,”32 the case had silently lurked behind an almost universal dark 
matter consensus. Few would disagree that the forced relocation of thousands 
of Americans to internment camps based solely on ethnic origin33 is undoubt-
edly wrong.34 Whether Chief Justice Roberts’s dicta is enough to finally bury 
Korematsu is still, however, an open question.35 The 1927 case Buck v. Bell, in 
which the Supreme Court upheld the forced sterilization of a woman, with Jus-
tice Holmes infamously claiming that “three generations of imbeciles are 
enough,” also remains on the books and serves as a contrasting example.36 The 
Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu, I argue, are far more likely to be in-
voked or revived until their formal rescission. Buck may formally survive but 
is unlikely to influence future caselaw.37 
In this Article, I help explain the unseen force at play in these examples. 
This Article adds to the existing literature in three ways. First, I explore how 
dark matter constrains behavior and creates an expectation that behavior in-
consistent with that norm will result in legal sanction.38 Dark matter can dis-
suade a legislative body from enacting a law apparently authorized by ordinary 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id.; see Dean, supra note 18, at 189 (stating that the Supreme Court in 1944 in Korematsu v. 
United States “closed its eyes to racial discrimination”). Perhaps it is not a coincidence that when 
defending President Trump’s proposal to ban the entry of Muslims into the United States, one supporter 
raised Korematsu as authorization for Congress to pass such legislation. Margaret Hartmann, Trump 




 32 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
 33 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (“We uphold the exclusion order . . . . In doing so, we are not un-
mindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens. But hardships are 
part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel 
the impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as it is privi-
leges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier.” (citations omitted)). 
 34 See infra notes 313–318 and accompanying text. 
 35 Compare Dean, supra note 18, at 175–76 (noting that despite Chief Justice Roberts’s assuranc-
es that comparisons between Korematsu and its 2018 case Trump v. Hawaii were flawed, “the lan-
guage and reasoning of the two decisions are eerily similar”), and Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Ha-
waii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 
641, 642–43 (2019), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/trump-v-hawaii [https://perma.cc/9F37-
2P9K], and Kaelyne Yumul Wietelman, Disarming Jackson’s (Re)Loaded Weapon: How Trump v. 
Hawaii Reincarnated Korematsu and How They Can Be Overruled, 23 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 
43, 44–46 (2019), with Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Trump Travel Ban: Rhetoric vs Reality, 44 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 491, 521–22 (2019) (discussing “Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion where she drew 
an unwarranted parallel between the World War II era case of Korematsu v. United States and the 
majority’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii”). 
 36 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 37 See infra notes 359–386 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 278–349 and accompanying text. 
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matter but that members of the legislative body instinctively and collectively 
expect to be challenged and struck down. In that sense, dark matter does sig-
nificant work. In the realm of plenary power, dark matter imposes limits on the 
legislative power to regulate immigration that might appear unlimited if our 
lens focuses only on ordinary matter. Dark matter forms a protective barrier 
around The Chinese Exclusion Case that prevents the development of the ple-
nary power doctrine from collapsing back toward the specific holding of that 
case. 
Second, I examine the factors that allow dark matter to both weaken ordi-
nary matter and insulate it from review. I identify three important factors that 
lead to this counterintuitive result.39 First, significant time has elapsed since 
the making of a law without that specific law being acknowledged as legiti-
mate. This might be a decision in a case that lingers “on the books” without 
being expressly reaffirmed or revisited or a statute that has long remained un-
enforced. Second, the ordinary matter at issue—whether a case or statute—
nonetheless plays an important functional role in subsequent development of 
law in the area. It may be, for example, that an opinion in a case establishes a 
general principle of law that forms the basis of an entire subsequent generation 
of cases, even if those subsequent cases do not repeat the specific holding of its 
predecessor. Third, the case or statute is consistent with the legal and social 
culture existing at the time it is issued. In other words, a holding was not obvi-
ously wrong the day it was decided, and, in the case of a legislative act, a stat-
ute was not obviously invalid the day it was passed. When all three of these 
factors are present, dark matter pulls against a precedent’s specific holding or a 
statute’s specific rule and negates some of its precedential value. At the same 
time, it insulates the precedent or statute from review as legal actors avoid act-
ing to the full extent authorized by the precedent or statute. 
Third, I describe how different legal actors—legislative actors, judicial 
actors, and executive actors—may respond to the tension between dark matter 
and ordinary matter.40 I argue that the executive branch may be least con-
strained by dark matter and therefore in a position to revive long-forgotten or-
dinary matter. This raises important questions. What obligation do legislators 
and judges have to address formal law that lurks in the background but is un-
likely to be invoked? Should there be a mechanism that allows judges to inval-
idate old precedent without a live case? 
To detail my arguments, I begin in Part I by discussing the ordinary mat-
ter in immigration law’s plenary power doctrine—the seminal Supreme Court 
decisions in this area.41 I examine this more observable part of immigration 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See infra notes 262–267 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 389–399 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra Part I. 
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law’s plenary power to trace the origins of and developments in plenary power. 
In Part II, I discuss existing academic commentary on immigration law’s ple-
nary power, much of which is a critique of its extra-constitutional nature, and 
highlight the current confusion that surrounds plenary power in today’s com-
mentary.42 This sets the stage for Part III, in which I propose that the confusion 
surrounding the scope of plenary power stems from the accumulation of dark 
matter that pulls against the holdings of The Chinese Exclusion Case and its 
progeny.43 Because dark matter is difficult to observe, I examine dark matter’s 
effect on legal actors, including Congress, the President, and the Supreme 
Court. I also describe the conditions that led to the accumulation of dark matter 
in the realm of plenary power to distill three indicators that, when all present, 
mean that dark matter is likely significantly constraining behavior and insulat-
ing ordinary matter from review. To illustrate how these indicators play out in 
other areas, I explore Korematsu and Buck as additional examples of dark mat-
ter pulling against ordinary matter in Part IV.44 I offer a brief discussion of how 
different legal actors may respond to dark matter in Part V,45 followed by a 
conclusion and questions for the future.46 
I. THE CHINESE EXCLUSION CASE AND ITS PROGENY: ORDINARY MATTER IN 
AN EXTRAORDINARY IMMIGRATION LAW UNIVERSE 
Before embarking on an exploration of law’s dark matter, I focus first on 
the ordinary matter of immigration law’s plenary power—Supreme Court prece-
dent. This ordinary matter reveals an extraordinary constellation in the immigra-
tion law universe. Congress’s historical regulation of naturalization, entry, or 
deportation of noncitizens appears to mock deeply rooted constitutional ideals. 
For example, Congress has imposed more burdensome naturalization require-
ments on children born out of wedlock to U.S. citizen fathers than those imposed 
on similarly-situated children of U.S. citizen mothers.47 Congress has provided 
for the exclusion of returning legal permanent residents without notice and op-
portunity for a hearing,48 as well as barred the entry of immigrants based on po-
litical opinion.49 The Supreme Court has upheld these discriminatory actions 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See infra Part II. 
 43 See infra Part III. 
 44 See infra Part IV. 
 45 See infra Part V. 
 46 See infra Conclusion. 
 47 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), and id. § 1409(a) (naturalization requirements for children born 
out of wedlock to U.S. citizen fathers), with id. § 1409(c) (naturalization requirements for children 
born out of wedlock to U.S. citizen mothers). 
 48 See Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943). 
 49 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D). 
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under the broadly deferential doctrine of “plenary power.”50 In this Part, I dis-
cuss these decisions—the ordinary matter of immigration law’s plenary power 
doctrine—both to (1) illustrate the image of plenary power that emerges from a 
traditional analysis of precedent and (2) highlight the vacuous spaces in between 
those precedents. This Part contextualizes my discussion in Part II of dark mat-
ter, the substance that fills those spaces. Part I.A examines the origins of plenary 
power in the immigration context,51 and Part I.B highlights questions over the 
constitutionality of plenary power in the wake of The Chinese Exclusion Case.52 
A. The Origins of Immigration Law’s Plenary Power Doctrine 
The disconcerting origins of Congress’s plenary power over immigration 
derive from an era of intense racial bias against Chinese immigrants.53 In The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, a Chinese national, Chae Chan Ping, who had been 
living in the United States for over a decade departed on a temporary visit to 
China.54 At the time Chae Chan Ping left, Chinese immigrants were barred 
from entering the United States under the Chinese Exclusion Act.55 Congress, 
however, provided that Chinese legal permanent residents who planned to 
travel abroad could return to the United States with a certificate authorizing 
reentry.56 When Chae Chan Ping left the United States, he carried the required 
reentry certificate.57 Upon his return to the United States, however, Chae Chan 
Ping was not allowed to disembark.58 Rather, he discovered that Congress had 
invalidated all return certificates. Because Congress had acted while Chae 
Chan Ping had been in a steamship crossing the Pacific Ocean on his return 
trip home to the United States, there was nothing Chae Chan Ping could have 
done—short of jumping ship and swimming back to China—to avoid exclu-
sion and detention upon his arrival.59 
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the invalidation of the reentry 
certificate as fully within Congress’s power to “exclude aliens from its territo-
ry.”60 The power to exclude aliens, however, appears nowhere in the Constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001) (naturalization requirement differences); Harisiades 
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952) (deportation based on Communist party affiliation); Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (legal permanent resident exclusion). 
 51 See infra Part I.A. 
 52 See infra Part I.B. 
 53 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 8, at 348 (tracing the development of the plenary power doctrine to 
“racially discriminatory” laws); Martin, supra note 8, at 30 (noting that The Chinese Exclusion Case 
and its challenged law “stemmed from xenophobic and racist agitation”). 
 54 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581. 
 55 Id. at 597–98. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 582. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 603. 
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tion. Rather, the Court held that such power was inherent in the country’s very 
existence as “an incident of sovereignty.”61 “If [the government of the United 
States] could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control 
of another power,”62 an untenable result in the Court’s eyes. 
A modern reader of the Court’s opinion might characterize the holding in 
The Chinese Exclusion Case as an artifact of a time when pernicious racism 
against Chinese immigrants went unpunished—and even was sanctioned—by 
the law.63 Though that is certainly part of the story,64 it is not the whole story. 
The Court had already recognized, just three years before The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, that the Constitution protected Chinese immigrants from racial dis-
crimination in at least some circumstances. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court 
struck down a San Francisco ordinance that required individuals who operated 
laundries in wood buildings to obtain a permit.65 Although the safety ordinance 
purportedly addressed the risk of fire in wood buildings, the Supreme Court 
held that the ordinance impermissibly discriminated against San Francisco’s 
Chinese residents, who owned the vast majority of laundries in the city and 
were disproportionately imprisoned for violations of the ordinance.66 The 
Court held that the discrimination, which could not be explained as anything 
other than “hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners be-
long,” violated the Fourteenth Amendment.67 
In Yick Wo, the Court unambiguously identified and condemned racial bi-
as where it believed the law prohibited that bias.68 The Court’s decision in The 
Chinese Exclusion Case in the wake of Yick Wo suggests that something more 
than culturally accepted racial biases motivated the Court. Rather, a legal dis-
tinction motivated the Court. One obvious legal distinction between the two 
cases is the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment. Principles of equal 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. at 609. 
 62 Id. at 604. 
 63 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Pre-
diction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
257, 260–64 (2000) (tracing the racist origins of The Chinese Exclusion Case and noting that during 
this period, racially discriminatory laws against both citizens and non-citizens were common). 
 64 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Consti-
tutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 551 (1990) (“We must bear in mind 
that this was an earlier era of constitutional law, when equal protection was well on its way to ‘sepa-
rate but equal,’ and judicial recognition of the substantive and procedural rights of individuals was 
still far beyond the constitutional horizon.”). 
 65 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 66 Id. at 358, 362, 373–74. 
 67 Id. at 374. 
 68 See id. (“The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the public administration which enforces it 
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.”). 
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protection derived from the Fourteenth Amendment would not apply to the 
federal government’s actions until 1954.69 
But a more fundamental distinction between Yick Wo and The Chinese 
Exclusion Case highlights the underlying rationale for the plenary power doc-
trine of immigration law. One case centered on Congress’s right to exclude 
noncitizens from the country,70 while the other dealt with the ordinary govern-
ance of individuals already present in the United States.71 Indeed, The Chinese 
Exclusion Case considered core immigration law—the rules that regulate entry 
into the United States.72 Yick Wo, in contrast, involved a local ordinance that 
purportedly sought to promote safety in San Francisco.73 Yick Wo and subse-
quent cases established that the Constitution generally applies fully to cases 
not directly involving immigration matters, especially if the government actor 
is a state or locality.74 But for the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case, the 
federal government’s ability to regulate its borders justified wide latitude for 
Congress. In sweeping language, the Court hinted that this power was subject 
to little constitutional restraint or Court review:75 
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign ag-
gression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and 
to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordi-
nated . . . . If, therefore, the government of the United States, 
through its legislative department, considers the presence of for-
eigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate 
with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“In view of our decision that the Constitution 
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that 
the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”). 
 70 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 597–98 (1889) (considering a law banning 
immigration from China). 
 71 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374 (upholding a San Francisco permit requirement for laundry ser-
vices, even though, as applied, the requirement disproportionately impacted Chinese laundromats—
not one Chinese owned laundromat received a permit, yet all but one non-Chinese owned laundromat 
did receive a permit). 
 72 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 597–98. 
 73 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. 
 74 LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 
4, 123–29 (2006) (“Citizenship, we tend to think, is hard on the outside and soft on the inside, with 
hard edges and soft interior together constituting a complete citizenship package. Yet the complemen-
tarity aspired to in this construct of citizenship can stand only so long as the hard outer edge actually 
separates inside from outside.”). 
 75 Sarah Cleveland has helpfully distilled plenary power—a concept that plays out in immigration 
law, federal Indian law, and foreign relations—into three essential characteristics. Plenary power is (1) 
inherent to sovereignty rather than enumerated in the Constitution; (2) subject to few or no constitu-
tional constraints; and (3) subject to limited, if any, judicial review. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers In-
herent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary 
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2002). 
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not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities 
with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects . . . . [I]ts deter-
mination is conclusive upon the judiciary.76 
The Supreme Court would subsequently pull Congress’s deportation laws 
under the plenary power doctrine’s cloak. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
the Court held that, like the exclusion of noncitizens, the deportation of noncit-
izens was inherent to U.S. sovereignty.77 Fong Yue Ting involved a challenge 
to certain provisions included in an extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act.78 
Congress required Chinese immigrants already present in the United States to 
secure a certificate proving that their residency in the United States pre-dated 
the new extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act.79 An immigrant without the 
required certificate would be deported unless a white person could attest to the 
immigrant’s residency.80 A divided Court rejected the claimants’ procedural 
due process challenge to the white-witness rule.81 Reasoning that the power to 
deport was a necessary corollary of the power to exclude, the majority upheld 
the white-witness rule, going so far as to say that Congress could have sum-
marily deported the claimants in the same way that it could have summarily 
excluded them from entering the United States.82 
Over the next decade, the Supreme Court would continue to embed the 
plenary power doctrine into constitutional immigration law as it upheld Con-
gress’s anti-Asian immigration laws. A snapshot of the plenary power doctrine 
just after the turn of the century depicts a virtual blank check for Congress’s 
substantive immigration laws. Not only could Congress permissibly exclude 
immigrants based on race and/or national origin, but it could also deport them on 
that basis.83 The Court recognized in two early cases that, in theory, Congress 
had to meet some basic procedural due process requirements in cases dealing 
with immigrants present in the United States.84 The Court, however, would not 
invalidate the application of an immigration law on that basis until 1953.85 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
 77 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893). 
 78 Id. at 699 n.1. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 732. 
 82 Id.; see also Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
 83 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 698. 
 84 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903); Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660. 
 85 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601–02 (1953) (holding that a non-citizen’s “sta-
tus as a person within the meaning and protection of the Fifth Amendment cannot be capriciously 
taken from him” and that the Court’s limited holding “does not leave an unprotected spot in the Na-
tion’s armor”). 
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B. Plenary Power and the Constitution After Chinese Exclusion 
Plenary power has played a role in a wide spectrum of cases, from core 
immigration law decisions (admission and removal decisions) to decisions that 
do not directly concern immigration but nonetheless have a distinct effect on 
noncitizens (alienage law),86 and scholars have catalogued and explored the 
strength of the plenary power doctrine in multiple contexts.87 Scholars have 
noted the waning strength of the plenary power doctrine where procedural pro-
                                                                                                                           
 86 Alienage law concerns the application of the law to noncitizens who are within the United 
States. While the plenary power doctrine does not, in theory, apply to alienage law decisions, the line 
between immigration law and alienage law is sometimes blurry. For example, does Congress’s limita-
tion of means-tested public assistance to citizens and residents who have lived in the United States for 
over five years amount to immigration law? It certainly does not directly regulate entry and removal 
from the United States, but such legislation might be a method of disincentivizing immigration. In 
1976, in Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court subjected this distinction based on citizenship and long-
term authorized residence to rational basis review despite its earlier review of similar state legislation 
under a strict scrutiny standard. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). One explanation for the difference is that plenary 
power might have some effect even outside of core immigration law decisions. For a critique of the 
distinction between alienage and immigration law, see Cox, supra note 8, at 343 (“[L]egal rules can-
not be classified as concerning either selection or regulation because every rule concerns both. Every 
rule that imposes duties on noncitizens imposes . . . selection pressure . . . .”). 
 87 See generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITU-
TION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002) (examining the plenary power’s durability and 
arguing for less rigid notions of state power and citizenship); BOSNIAK, supra note 74 (surveying the 
immigration policies of several countries, most notably the United States); Chin, supra note 63 (dis-
cussing the powerful force that the plenary power doctrine exerts on immigration law); Kevin R. 
Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexception-
alism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court] (con-
tending that, although the Court has extended procedural due process protections for non-citizens, the 
plenary power doctrine still insulates most of Congress’s substantive immigration decisions from 
judicial review); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is 
There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
continues to tolerate racial classifications in the field of immigration law); Motomura, supra note 64, 
at 545–613 (noting that the plenary power doctrine has led courts to skirt difficult decisions by invali-
dating laws based on sub-constitutional challenges, but arguing that courts should address these con-
stitutional questions); Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political 
Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987) (considering the use of the plenary power doctrine to sup-
port the government’s ideological exclusions of foreign speakers who espouse disagreeable view-
points); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002). A 
survey of this scholarship and relevant case law suggests that the plenary power doctrine has been 
most consistently and successfully invoked to shield core federal immigration law from substantive 
constitutional claims. When it comes to procedural constitutional claims in core immigration law 
cases, the Court has been more willing to recognize limits to the plenary power doctrine. And when 
states attempt to legislate in an area that overlaps with core immigration law, the Court is swift to 
invalidate state legislation as federally preempted. In the realm of alienage law, the Court has not 
hesitated to follow the 1886 Yick Wo v. Hopkins Court’s lead in requiring states to comply with con-
stitutional limitations—both substantive and procedural—on state power. The extent to which the 
federal government must comply with constitutional limitations in alienage law is less clear. The 
Court has subjected federal legislation that distinguishes based on immigration status to less rigorous 
scrutiny than it imposes on states, even where that federal legislation does not directly govern core 
immigration functions. 
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tections are at issue and in cases that are only tangentially related to immigra-
tion.88 My interest here, however, is specific to substantive constitutional is-
sues in core immigration law cases—those that involve a noncitizen’s ability to 
enter and remain in the United States. This, after all, is the realm of The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case and recent proposals to ban the entry of Muslims into the 
United States. It is also where the Supreme Court’s language has historically 
most boldly affirmed the plenary power doctrine. But, as I will explain in Part 
II below, it is also where significant dark matter has accumulated to alter the 
legal landscape.89 
Although Asians have been the only group to be categorically denied en-
try based on race, Congress has enacted immigration laws that have barred 
entry based on other criteria that otherwise would be constitutionally suspect.90 
In addressing challenges to such provisions, the Court has consistently upheld 
them, sometimes avoiding the plenary power issue and deciding the case on 
other grounds,91 and sometimes addressing plenary power directly. Though 
plenary power has played a role in cases that have featured a variety of sub-
stantive constitutional challenges, many of the most significant plenary power 
cases arose from challenges to limits based on political opinion and gender.92 I 
discuss cases concerning political opinion in Subsection 1.93 In subsection 2, I 
explore opinions related to gender.94 
1. Plenary Power and Political Opinion 
Perhaps second only to the era of Chinese exclusion, midcentury McCar-
thyism propelled the plenary power doctrine into Supreme Court jurisprudence 
more than any other historical political phenomenon.95 Fearful of communist 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 24 (2015), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1164&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/F2MC-LQ5Q] (noting the limitations that procedural due 
process imposes on the plenary power doctrine). 
 89 See infra Part II. 
 90 See Motomura, supra note 64, at 550–60 (tracing the evolution of the plenary power in the 
immigration context). 
 91 See id. at 548 (considering two competing approaches that litigants sometimes use to challenge 
immigration laws). Petitioners often bring constitutional challenges, but some commentators believe 
that judges treat “subconstitutional” challenges—arguments that the government violated statutes or 
administrative regulations—more favorably than constitutional ones. Id. 
 92 See infra notes 95–141 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 95–122 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 123–141 and accompanying text. 
 95 See, e.g., Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. L. REV. 179, 215 
(2016) (noting that the Supreme Court first recognized the plenary power doctrine in the 1880’s but 
the doctrine played a more prominent role in immigration and national security law during the 1950s; 
Victor Romero, On Elián and Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 343, 350 (2000) (noting that the plenary power doctrine resurfaced with greater 
strength in the 1950s). 
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infiltration into American minds and, ultimately, the American political sys-
tem, the federal government actively excluded and deported individuals based 
on potential connections to communism.96 This sometimes came in the form of 
exploiting existing statutes designed to exclude individuals who were national 
security threats,97 and sometimes it involved Congress enacting new grounds 
for exclusion.98 The Supreme Court repeatedly declined to interfere in result-
ing exclusions and deportations. 
One of the government’s tools of communist exclusion was an existing 
provision of the 1918 War Time Passport Act (Passport Act) that allowed the 
Attorney General to exclude noncitizens whose “entry would be prejudicial to 
the interest of the United States.”99 Under this conveniently vague provision, 
the government excluded several individuals who ultimately appealed their 
cases to the Supreme Court.100 One of them, Ignatz Mezei, had been a resident 
of the United States for twenty-five years when he left to visit his dying mother 
in Romania.101 Mezei never made it to his mother’s bedside, as he was denied 
entry to Romania. He instead spent nineteen months in Hungary struggling to 
secure an exit permit so he could return home to the United States.102 Upon 
finally reaching U.S. shores, the Attorney General excluded him under the 
Passport Act provision and detained him on Ellis Island.103 Besides giving the 
Attorney General broad discretion to exclude an individual, the Passport Act 
also allowed the Attorney General to proceed without giving the excluded in-
dividual notice of the grounds of exclusion or a hearing.104 Unable to return to 
his home and wife in Buffalo, New York, and ignorant of the reasons why the 
United States excluded him, Mezei began seeking admission to several coun-
tries.105 Perhaps based on his exclusion in the United States, no country would 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See Lindsay, supra note 95, at 251 n.390 (noting the “extraordinary breadth of the class of 
persons that Congress made deportable—any noncitizen who knowingly joined the Communist Party, 
without regard to the timing or duration of membership”); Romero, supra note 95, at 361. 
 97 See, e.g., Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559, amended by Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 
55 Stat. 252 (repealed 1952); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), super-
seded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), as recognized in DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). 
 98 See, e.g., Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 137) (repealed 1952); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 581 (1952) (considering a law au-
thorizing the deportation of Communist Party members). 
 99 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210 (quoting Proclamation No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (Nov. 14, 1941)). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 208. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 208–09. 
 104 Id. at 210–11. 
 105 Id. at 209. 
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accept him.106 The Supreme Court upheld Mezei’s exclusion in 1953 without a 
hearing, in effect permanently marooning Mezei on Ellis Island.107 
Though the issue before the Supreme Court in Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei was a procedural one—whether the lack of hearing violat-
ed the Constitution—the Court spoke in sweeping language and hinted at the 
ultimate substantive issue, exclusion based on political opinion.108 It opined 
that “Whatever [the Court’s] individual estimate of that policy and the fears on 
which it rests, respondent’s right to enter the United States depends on the 
congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legisla-
tive mandate.”109 The Court noted that Mezei had “remained behind the Iron 
Curtain for [nineteen] months” and explained that “the times being what they 
are,” Congress should be at peace despite the ultimate result: indefinite deten-
tion on Ellis Island.110 
While the Attorney General leveraged the Passport Act to exclude individu-
als like Mezei, Congress passed provisions designed to deport communists al-
ready residing in the United States. One of those provisions authorized deporta-
tion for any individual who had been a past member of the Communist party.111 
In a 1952 Supreme Court case, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, three noncitizen U.S. 
residents argued that the Fifth Amendment limited Congress’s power to deport 
long-term residents for past membership in the Communist party.112 One of the 
individuals had arrived in the United States when he was only thirteen years old 
and had been a legal resident of the United States for over forty years.113 Citing 
to cases from the era of Chinese exclusion, the Court affirmed Congress’s “pow-
er to terminate its hospitality” toward noncitizens at any time and for virtually 
any reason.114 The Due Process Clause, the Court held, made no difference in the 
case: “Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of gov-
ernment as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”115 The 
Court thus upheld the noncitizens’ deportation orders. 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 216. Ultimately, political pressure secured Mezei’s release. In some ways, this suggests 
that plenary power gets worked out through political dynamics, but this is not the case for individuals 
who have never been in the United States and who therefore have little political leverage in the United 
States. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 214, 216. 
 111 See, e.g., Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 137) (repealed 1952). 
 112 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 584 (1952). 
 113 Id. at 581–82. 
 114 Id. at 587 (“War, of course, is the most usual occasion for extensive resort to the power . . . . 
But it does not require war to bring the power of deportation into existence or to authorize its exer-
cise.”). 
 115 Id. at 589. For a discussion of the term “political branches,” and how the power to regulate 
immigration power is shared by the executive and legislative branches, see Adam B. Cox & Cristina 
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Twenty years later in 1972, the Court considered the case of Kleindienst v. 
Mandel.116 There, several U.S. citizens challenged the exclusion of Ernest E. 
Mandel, a Belgian national who advocated Marxist ideology in his speeches 
and numerous writings.117 Under the McCarran-Walter Act, noncitizens who 
“write or publish . . . the economic, international, and governmental doctrines 
of world communism” were barred from entry.118 The U.S. citizen claimants 
argued that excluding Mandel impermissibly limited their First Amendment 
rights to meet with Mandel.119 While the Court recognized that the First 
Amendment indeed protected individuals’ access to ideas and information, it 
explained that the plenary power doctrine protects any “facially legitimate and 
bona fide reason” for excluding a noncitizen.120 The government offered a 
speech-neutral reason for excluding Mandel—a prior violation of a visa.121 
This, the Court held, was sufficiently legitimate to override the U.S. citizen 
claimants’ First Amendment right to access ideas.122 
2. Plenary Power and Gender 
Soon after Mandel, in 1977, the Court upheld a provision in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA) that discriminated based on sex and illegitima-
cy.123 In Fiallo v. Bell, the Court examined the INA’s definition of “child.”124 
Although the biological offspring of any woman was considered a “child” un-
der the INA, a baby born out of wedlock to a man was not.125 As a result, a 
U.S. citizen father could not seek immigration benefits for his child born out of 
wedlock even where a U.S. citizen mother could.126 Likewise, a U.S. citizen 
child born out of wedlock could facilitate immigration benefits for her mother, 
but not her father.127 The Court quoted its Harisiades opinion to explain that 
Congress’s immigration decision was “solely for the responsibility of the Con-
                                                                                                                           
M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 471–72 (2009) (“In Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, in which a divided Court held that the power to deport was a corollary to the 
power to exclude, the Court similarly treated as an open question whether the Executive can act to 
exclude or expel aliens without authorization from Congress.” (citing 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). 
 116 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 117 Id. at 756, 759. 
 118 Id. at 755 (quoting Immigration and Nationality (McCarren-Walter) Act, ch. 477, 
§ 212(a)(28)(G), 66 Stat. 182, 185 (1952) (amended 1990)). 
 119 Id. at 754. 
 120 Id. at 770. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 124 Id. at 788–89. 
 125 Id. at 789. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
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gress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.”128 Today’s INA 
recognizes the relationship between a child born out of wedlock to his father 
for immigration purposes “if the father has or had a bona fide parent-child rela-
tionship” with the child.129 
Congress’s rules governing citizenship (as opposed to immigration) of 
children born abroad to U.S. citizen parents have historically raised a similar 
issue. The INA imposes more burdensome requirements for granting birthright 
citizenship to nonmarital children born abroad to U.S. citizen fathers than for 
nonmarital children of U.S. citizen mothers.130 The Court first considered a 
challenge to the distinction in Miller v. Albright in 1998.131 The Court ultimate-
ly decided the case on the issue of standing, but the Justices did discuss the 
plenary power doctrine in the split opinion.132 The Justices disagreed on 
whether the plenary power doctrine applied, whether plenary power would 
fully shield the provision from constitutional analysis, or whether it would 
merely dilute the standard that would apply to constitutional analysis.133 
In 2001, the Court had an opportunity to again confront the gender-based 
distinction in citizenship rules for nonmarital children born abroad to U.S. citi-
zens in Nguyen v. INS.134 In a five-four decision, Justice Kennedy explained 
that because the statute satisfied traditional equal protection analysis there was 
no need to address the plenary power issue.135 Important government objec-
tives, according to the majority, justified the citizenship rules, which were sub-
stantially related to those objectives.136 Justice O’Connor wrote the dissent.137 
She, along with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that despite its 
claims to the contrary, the majority had actually employed a more lenient 
standard than the Court would normally apply in traditional analysis of gender-
based classifications.138 Justice O’Connor and her fellow dissenters recognized 
plenary power’s mark in the opinion even if the majority did not. 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Id. at 796 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952)). 
 129 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D). 
 130 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 429–30 (1998). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See id. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[j]udicial power over immigration 
and naturalization is extremely limited” and that the Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized the power 
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute” (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792)). 
 134 See generally 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a law that installed more restrictive citizenship 
requirements for children born outside the United States to unmarried U.S. citizen fathers than to 
children born outside the United States to unmarried U.S. citizen mothers). 
 135 Id. at 72–73 (“In light of our holding that there is no equal protection violation . . . . we need 
not assess the implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding the wide deference afforded to 
Congress in the exercise of its immigration and naturalization power.”). 
 136 Id. at 70. 
 137 Id. at 74–97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 138 Id. at 97 (“No one should mistake the majority’s analysis for a careful application of this 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifications. Today’s decision instead 
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The Supreme Court only recently invalidated one of the discriminatory 
provisions related to birthright citizenship for children born outside of the United 
States in Sessions v. Morales-Santana.139 There, the Court abandoned its prior 
precedents and applied a rather unexceptional equal protection analysis to inval-
idate a provision that gave preferential treatment to unwed U.S. citizen mothers 
as compared to their male counterparts.140 At the same time, as discussed in 
more detail in Part II below, the Court was careful to leave plenary power intact 
by distinguishing citizenship rules from immigration rules and explaining that 
similar discriminatory immigration rules had historically been upheld in defer-
ence to Congress’s expansive power—plenary power—in the field.141 
II. THE PLENARY POWER TODAY: CONFUSION AND SILENCE 
Given this background, what are the contours of plenary power today? 
Does the doctrine authorize Congress to ban entry into the United States based 
on race? Does plenary power remain “segregation’s last stronghold?”142 And 
what about religion? The answer is not clear to legal commentators and lower 
court judges, and recent Supreme Court precedent is conspicuously silent on 
the plenary power doctrine. In this Part, I discuss the confusion that surrounds 
plenary power today to set the stage for my argument in Part III that dark mat-
ter has accumulated in this field to pull against the broad congressional author-
ity to enact substantive immigration law with little constitutional restraint.143 
Part II.A provides an overview of current uncertainty regarding the plenary 
power doctrine.144 Part II.B considers the Supreme Court’s silence concerning 
the scope of plenary power today.145 
                                                                                                                           
represents a deviation from a line of cases in which we have vigilantly applied heightened scrutiny to 
such classifications to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred.”). 
 139 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
 140 See id. at 1690 (“Prescribing one rule for mothers, another for fathers, § 1409 is of the same 
genre as the classifications we declared unconstitutional in [prior cases]. As in those cases, heightened 
scrutiny is in order. Successful defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender, we 
have reiterated, requires an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification.’” (quoting United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996))). 
 141 See id. at 1693. Specifically, the Court distinguished Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), in 
which the Court had upheld the preferential treatment of U.S. citizen mothers in petitioning for a 
child’s entry into the United States. See id. (“Applying minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review), the 
[Fiallo] Court upheld the provision, relying on Congress’ ‘exceptionally broad power’ to admit or 
exclude aliens . . . . This case, however, involves no entry preference for aliens.”). 
 142 Chin, supra note 12. 
 143 See infra Part II. 
 144 See infra Part II.A. 
 145 See infra Part II.B. 
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A. Modern Confusion Surrounding Plenary Power 
A brief look at the recent academic debate surrounding President Trump’s 
original travel ban proposal, as well as an interesting exchange among judges 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in an unrelated case, hints at 
the enormous chasm in the current understanding of the plenary power doc-
trine. In subsection 1, I examine the scholarly debate concerning the proposed 
travel ban,146 and I discuss similar confusion about the scope of plenary power 
in lower courts in subsection 2.147 
1. Academic Discussion Surrounding the Proposed Travel Ban 
Admittedly, a basic reading of the ordinary matter of plenary power sug-
gests that a ban based on religion or race would be constitutional as a close 
analog of the legislation at issue in The Chinese Exclusion Case. Several 
scholars, including Professors Eric Posner, Peter Spiro, and Eugene Volokh 
took this approach when considering the validity of Trump’s campaign pro-
posal to ban the entry of Muslim immigrants. 148 In a New York Times opinion 
piece, Professor Peter Spiro explained: “Unlike other bygone constitutional 
curiosities that offend our contemporary sensibilities, the Chinese Exclusion 
case has never been overturned. More recent decisions have upheld discrimina-
tion against immigrants based on gender and illegitimacy that would never 
have survived equal protection scrutiny in the domestic context.”149 Professor 
Eric Posner suggested that the only reasonable conclusion is that an immigra-
tion ban on Muslims would be constitutional and called into question the mo-
tives of scholars concluding otherwise: 
[A]ny honest answer to a journalist’s question about whether 
Trump’s plan to ban Muslim immigration is unconstitutional should 
start with the plenary powers doctrine, and observe that it would be 
an uphill battle to persuade the Supreme Court to abandon a century 
of precedent. Unfortunately, that is not what scholars—who certain-
ly know better—are telling journalists. They are likely being abetted 
by journalists and headline writers who don’t like the idea that 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 147 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 148 Posner, supra note 2 (“The Court has repeatedly turned away challenges to immigration stat-
utes and executive actions on grounds that they discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, and 
political belief . . . . While the Court has not ruled on religious discrimination, it has also never given 
the slightest indication that religion would be exempt from the general rule.”); Spiro, supra note 2; 
Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Banning Muslims from Entering the U.S. Is a Very Bad Idea—But It May 
Be Constitutionally Permissible, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
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may-be-constitutionally-permissible/ [https://perma.cc/BX6U-AXYN]. 
 149 Spiro, supra note 2. 
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Trump’s ban would be lawful. Not everything that is stupid or offen-
sive is unconstitutional.150 
In contrast, other scholars were quick to condemn Trump’s initial pro-
posal as unconstitutional. Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, concluded 
that such a proposal would violate the First Amendment’s religion clauses and 
the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection principle.151 Professor Michael Dorf 
and others agreed, though some recognized the question may be a difficult 
one.152 
That legal scholars could so readily disagree in their conclusions about 
President Trump’s proposal is fascinating in light of The Chinese Exclusion 
Case’s very existence. It is not that commentators disagree about the meaning 
of the case—I have not read any scholarly discussion on the substantive issue 
of whether The Chinese Exclusion Case would permit the enactment of the 
initial Trump proposal. Rather, the differing conclusions seem to stem from an 
implicit disagreement about whether and how much The Chinese Exclusion 
Case matters. Although some commentators have pointed at The Chinese Ex-
clusion Case to conclude, quite comfortably, that President Trump’s proposal 
would be constitutional, many scholars who have concluded otherwise have 
failed to mention The Chinese Exclusion Case at all.153 Instead, those commen-
tators simply assumed that traditional equal protection and First Amendment 
analysis would apply.154 
2. Lower Court Confusion Surrounding Plenary Power 
While President Trump formulated his final travel order and scholars dis-
cussed a possible “Muslim ban,” the apparent confusion over the current force 
of The Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny also played out in other con-
texts. In 2017, in Garza v. Hargan, D.C. Circuit judges disagreed about wheth-
er the plenary power doctrine applied in a dispute over whether a minor de-
tained in an immigration detention center could obtain an abortion.155 The D.C. 
Circuit, sitting en banc, reinstated an order from the district court requiring the 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Posner, supra note 2. 
 151 See Ari Melber, Law Experts Weigh Donald Trump’s Plan to Ban Muslims from U.S., NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/law-experts-weigh-donald-
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 152 See id. (quoting Cornell Law Professor Michael Dorf). 
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‘plenary power’ doctrine . . . . [and] dates back to the 1889 decision in the Chinese Exclusion case, in 
which the court upheld the exclusion of Chinese laborers based on their nationality.”). 
 154 See Melber, supra note 151 (quoting Professor Tribe as stating his belief that “[President] 
Trump’s unprecedented proposal would violate our Constitution”). 
 155 Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (per curiam) (mem.), judgment 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018). 
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government to allow the requested abortion.156 Judge Henderson, dissenting, 
accused the court of ignoring controlling plenary power decisions, including 
the 1972 Supreme Court case Kleindienst v. Mandel: “[f]ar from faithfully ap-
plying the Supreme Court’s abortion cases, this result contradicts them, along 
with a host of immigration and due-process cases the Court declines to even 
acknowledge.”157 Judge Henderson maintained that those cases demonstrate 
that even fundamental constitutional rights cannot override the plenary authori-
ty of the President and the legislature in the immigration context.158 She con-
tinued: “[B]ut the freedom to terminate one’s pregnancy is more fundamental 
than them all? This is not the law.”159 The plenary power applies, she conclud-
ed, with equal force regardless of the “constitutional entitlement” at issue.160 
That one D.C. Circuit judge would cite the plenary power doctrine and 
find it controlling while the litigants, including the federal government, and the 
rest of the judges remained silent on it is remarkable. That this same phenome-
non also played out in the realm of the Trump travel ban proposal suggests a 
disconnect between the ordinary matter on which the plenary power doctrine is 
based—cases like The Chinese Exclusion Case and Mandel—and legal actors’ 
understanding of what the law is. 
B. The Supreme Court and the Sound of Silence 
It is not surprising that legal commentators and federal district and appel-
late court judges are talking past each other about plenary power. The Supreme 
Court has offered little guidance on the contours of plenary power in the last 
decade, especially when it comes to the question of constitutional limits on 
substantive immigration law. The Court’s hesitancy to reaffirm the plenary 
power doctrine is not an altogether new phenomenon. Immigration law schol-
ars have observed the waning influence of the plenary power doctrine in Su-
preme Court decisions and called for the elimination of the doctrine for several 
decades.161 The Court’s continued silence, however, has not reassured those 
scholars. Instead, it has left many questions open.162 Subsection 1, below, dis-
cusses optimism among legal scholars that the Court would abolish the plenary 
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power doctrine.163 Subsection 2 examines the Supreme Court’s silence on the 
matter.164 
1. Historical Scholarly Enthusiasm for the End of Plenary Power 
Scholars were particularly hopeful that the Supreme Court would elimi-
nate the plenary power doctrine in the last decades of the twentieth century. In 
1990, Professor Hiroshi Motomura identified a repeated pattern of courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, resolving immigration law cases on statutory in-
terpretation rather than constitutional grounds to achieve the same result as the 
constitutional application would have required.165 The Court avoided the con-
stitutional question simply by interpreting statutes in a way that would comply 
with ordinary constitutional norms.166 In this way, Professor Motomura argued, 
phantom constitutional norms were percolating into immigration law in ways 
that the plenary power doctrine had historically precluded.167 He believed this 
signaled a softening of immigration law exceptionalism.168 
Almost a decade later, Professor Gabriel “Jack” Chin posited that plenary 
power may not exist at all.169 He noted that though The Chinese Exclusion 
Case and its progeny are incongruous with modern constitutional norms, their 
holdings do not require that immigration law be excepted from ordinary consti-
tutional norms.170 Rather, Professor Chin argued, these cases are not excep-
tional at all—they are consistent with the cultural and domestic constitutional 
norms of the era in which they were decided, and they instead could be read as 
calling for non-exceptionalism in immigration law.171 
Other scholars expressed similar criticism of plenary power and predicted 
its demise, but the plenary power doctrine proved to have more staying power 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 164 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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than those scholars had hoped.172 Since the 1990s, when scholars began pre-
dicting the end of plenary power, the Supreme Court has declined to terminate 
or expressly limit the doctrine.173 But the Court has also been reluctant to ex-
pressly reaffirm the doctrine in the immigration context.174 Recognizing the 
overly optimistic predictions of earlier scholarship, immigration law scholars 
have more recently predicted a more gradual decline for the plenary power 
doctrine. Professor Kevin Johnson and others have documented the Supreme 
Court’s increasingly tenuous relationship with the plenary power through de-
tailed analysis of its constitutional immigration jurisprudence over the last 
three decades.175 Their work shows, as Professor Johnson has noted, that 
“without eliminating the doctrine, the Court has silently moved away from an-
ything that might be characterized as immigration exceptionalism.”176 
I do not intend to revisit here all of these cases discussed at length by 
scholars elsewhere, many of them dealing with constitutional challenges to the 
procedures, rather than the substance, of immigration laws. Rather, I pause to 
examine a much narrower slice of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence—the 
Court’s treatment of recent constitutional challenges to substantive immigration 
law.177 
2. The Supreme Court’s Deliberate Silence 
Several types of judicial silence, some of them potentially more meaning-
ful than others, mark the last two decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
this area.178 Subsection a below discusses instances in which the Court has not 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 15, at 122 (noting that lower courts are becoming increasingly 
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 177 See infra notes 182–201 and accompanying text. 
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had the chance to rule on the plenary power doctrine.179 Subsection b high-
lights the Court’s avoidance of the plenary power doctrine.180 Next, subsection 
c explores the Court’s unspoken reliance on plenary power. Finally, subsection 
d reviews the Court’s deliberate efforts to reserve plenary power.181 
a. Lack of Opportunity 
The first kind of silence is not necessarily within the control of the Court: 
the Court cannot speak to the contours of plenary power if no cases implicate 
the issue. Indeed, the Supreme Court has had very few opportunities to decide 
the constitutionality of substantive immigration law in the last ten years. In 
fact, just a few immigration law cases during that time period can fairly be de-
scribed as implicating the Constitution’s applicability to substantive immigra-
tion law.182 The dearth of cases in this area renders the few decisions that do 
exist extremely important as ordinary matter. And that is why the Court’s more 
deliberate silence in those cases, as described below, is a particularly interest-
ing demonstration of the pull of dark matter. 
b. Avoidance: Trump v. Hawaii 
In 2018, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. Hawaii, the 
culmination of challenges to President Trump’s final travel ban.183 Some 
scholars had hoped the Court would shed some light on the contours of the 
plenary power doctrine, but the case instead reinforced uncertainty.184 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 180 See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
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President Trump’s order banned the arrival of travelers from seven coun-
tries that raised security concerns.185 The order issued, however, did not ex-
pressly mention religion despite President Trump’s inflammatory references to 
Islam in his repeated calls for a travel ban.186 Hawaii challenged the order, argu-
ing that the travel ban was motivated by religious preferences, as evidenced by 
President Trump’s rhetoric leading up to his order, and therefore invalid under 
the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.187 Five of the seven countries from 
which the order banned travelers were, indeed, majority Muslim countries.188 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing on behalf of the five-Justice majority, re-
jected Hawaii’s argument. President Trump’s prior rhetoric, he wrote, “does 
not support an inference of religious hostility, given that the policy covers just 
8% of the world’s Muslim population and is limited to countries that were pre-
viously designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national se-
curity risks.”189 The finding that religious hostility did not motivate the order 
essentially took the core issue that most interested scholars—the full contours 
of plenary power in a direct constitutional challenge—off the table.190 
Some scholars argued that the Court’s willingness to ignore President 
Trump’s prior rhetoric nonetheless evidenced the continuing role of the plenary 
power doctrine.191 But the core question remains: what is the legacy of The 
Chinese Exclusion Case? Does Congress—and perhaps the executive—have 
virtually unlimited power to regulate immigration? 
c. Unspoken Plenary Power: Kerry v. Din 
In other cases that implicated the application of the Constitution to substan-
tive immigration law, the Court’s deliberate silence on the plenary power doc-
trine has taken different forms. In the first, the Court hesitated to expressly rely 
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Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976) (internal citation omitted)). 
 191 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 35, at 642 (“Despite overturning Korematsu, the Court’s decision 
in Trump v. Hawaii perpetuates the very-near-blind deference to the executive branch that led the 
Korematsu Court astray.” (footnote omitted)). 
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on the plenary power doctrine while clearly operating under its weight. In Kerry 
v. Din, a 2015 case, the Court ultimately issued the same decision that the plena-
ry power doctrine would have required without reaffirming the plenary power 
doctrine.192 Din, a U.S. citizen, had petitioned for permanent residency for her 
husband, an Afghan citizen.193 Her husband was denied admission based on un-
disclosed security-related grounds.194 In a divided opinion, the Court rejected 
Din’s due process claim, which resulted in Din and her husband not being able to 
live together in the United States.195 Though this 2015 case was eerily similar to 
the Court’s 1950 decision in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei that up-
held the indefinite confinement of a noncitizen on Ellis Island based on secret 
security-related allegations, only the concurring opinion of Justices Kennedy and 
Alito even mentioned the plenary power doctrine or its seminal cases.196 
d. Reserved Plenary Power: Sessions v. Morales-Santana 
In another form of deliberate silence, the Court decided a case under or-
dinary constitutional analysis as if plenary power did not apply, while express-
ly reserving the possibility that the plenary power doctrine might apply in a 
different context. In 2017 in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, the Court upended a 
decades-old history of distinct citizenship rules for the foreign-born children of 
unwed U.S. citizen mothers and fathers.197 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
Court, applied a traditional equal protection analysis to hold that the foreign-
born children of unwed U.S. citizen fathers could not be subject to a more bur-
densome citizenship standard than the similarly situated children of U.S. citi-
zen mothers.198 
In reaching its holding, the Court summarily dismissed the government’s 
appeal to its 1977 opinion in Fiallo v. Bell (in which the Court upheld a statute 
that categorically excluded the alien children of U.S. citizen fathers from im-
migration eligibility).199 Fiallo, Justice Ginsburg wrote, relied on Congress’s 
“‘exceptionally broad power’ to admit or exclude aliens.”200 But Morales-
Santana, she asserted, was about someone who claimed to be a citizen, rather 
than an alien who hoped to immigrate as a noncitizen permanent resident.201 
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Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was, on the one hand, a victory for critics of plena-
ry power in that it seemed to remove birthright citizenship from plenary pow-
er’s grip. But on the other hand, the opinion left room for an expansive power 
that allows Congress to discriminate based on gender when it comes to immi-
grant admission decisions. 
III. PLENARY POWER’S DARK MATTER 
The confusion surrounding the plenary power doctrine gives rise to sever-
al important questions. First, is The Chinese Exclusion Case good law? Sec-
ond, if not, why has the Supreme Court declined to overturn it? I believe that if 
Congress were to enact a Chinese Exclusion-style, race-based categorical ban 
to entry into the United States, the Court would not uphold it. It is unlikely, 
however, that a case directly on point will arise given the amount of dark mat-
ter at play in this area. In this Part, I argue that dark matter does significant 
work in the realm of plenary power.202 Below, I begin by explaining what I 
mean by “dark matter” in Section A.203 In Section B, I highlight the way dark 
matter has affected Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court.204 In Sec-
tion C, I then discuss the conditions that have led to the accumulation of dark 
matter in the realm of plenary power.205 
A. What Is Dark Matter? 
My Article, up to this point, might seem to dodge a crucial question: What 
is dark matter in law and how does it form? For the purposes of this Article, a 
simple definition suffices: dark matter is a widely shared but informal (not in-
stitutionalized through formal lawmaking processes) understanding of the law 
that affects actors’ behavior. I am admittedly avoiding offering any theory 
about how dark matter forms or the sources for its content. This is, in part, be-
cause other scholars have already offered explanations for changing informal 
norms. Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, has described various types of 
constitutional interpretation modes and the way that each might result in extra-
textual “dark matter” constitutional norms.206 Professor Michael Steven Green 
has examined instances of rules from overturned case law lingering past the 
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death of those cases.207 These scholars have identified sources for the content of 
dark matter norms as well as ways that dark matter might come into existence.208 
Another reason I avoid offering a theory of how dark matter forms or the 
origin of its content is that it is immaterial to my argument. My purpose here is 
not to comment on dark matter and its formation, but rather to focus on dark 
matter’s interaction with the ordinary matter of law and dark matter’s concomi-
tant effect on legal actors. I hope to observe dark matter’s effects to identify its 
power and limitations. That is, regardless of what, exactly, dark matter is, I 
write to argue that dark matter does significant work in shaping the behavior of 
relevant actors. Moreover, I illustrate how dark matter may affect behavior 
differently across the three branches of government. My argument does not 
depend on the origin or content of the dark matter at issue. Just as physicists 
can observe dark matter’s results without knowing what makes up dark matter, 
I observe dark matter’s effect on the law without necessarily knowing how it 
arises. 
I will thus leave theories of the specific process for the development of 
dark matter, as well as the actual content of dark matter, to other scholars. That 
being said, several observations about dark matter are worth noting here. First, 
dark matter does not always conflict with ordinary matter of the law. I examine 
the conflict between dark matter and ordinary matter here merely because that 
is the context in which dark matter is most easily observed. But dark matter 
could reinforce ordinary matter or create norms where no ordinary matter exists. 
Second, dark matter is amoral. While I would characterize the dark matter 
that is limiting immigration law’s plenary power doctrine as “good,” that is not 
a defining feature of dark matter. Dark matter could also be “bad.” It could 
also be neither. And opinions could obviously vary. 
Third, dark matter is not limited to legal fields where court-made doctrine 
dominates. Dark matter may exist in areas of law governed by statutes, regula-
tions, and contracts. I discuss dark matter in the specific context of constitu-
tional case law because it limits the scope of my paper while still remaining 
broadly accessible. 
Finally, dark matter is not necessarily mysterious, unknowable, and un-
measurable. The dark matter analogy breaks down on this point. Though the 
dark matter of the universe is poorly understood, dark matter in the law may be 
susceptible to observation and measurement. Social science, for example, may 
certainly offer tools to measure public understanding of the law or what the 
law ought to be. I do not use the term “dark matter” to suggest otherwise. Ra-
ther, I use the dark matter analogy to distinguish informal norms from formal 
law and to further the discussion of how formal and informal norms interact. 
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B. Evidence of Dark Matter Surrounding The Chinese Exclusion Case 
In Parts I and II, I considered the ordinary matter of the plenary power 
doctrine—Supreme Court precedent—to highlight the vast empty spaces that 
characterize the plenary power doctrine and the resulting confusion and disa-
greement about the contours of the doctrine today.209 Here, I turn my attention 
away from court decisions and toward the behavior of legal actors. I examine 
the way the three branches of the federal government have treated The Chinese 
Exclusion Case outside of more direct, formal lawmaking activities.210 Subsec-
tion 1 focuses on Congress.211 Subsection 2 highlights the judiciary.212 Finally, 
subsection 3 addresses the President.213 
1. Congress 
Although the Supreme Court is responsible for creating the plenary power 
doctrine, Congress put the Court in a position to do so when it enacted the 
Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and elected not to repeal the Act until 1943.214 
Interestingly, even during the time that the Chinese Exclusion Act was on the 
books, Congress did not enact another categorical ban on immigration based 
on race. Further, Congress has not attempted to pass such a ban since repealing 
the Chinese Exclusion Act. This fact hints at Congress’s perception of its au-
thority to regulate immigration law in a way that, without plenary power, 
would violate the Constitution. 
More indicative of Congress’s perception that The Chinese Exclusion 
Case is not good law are Senate and House of Representatives resolutions la-
menting the passage of Chinese exclusion laws.215 In resolutions celebrating 
Asian/Pacific Heritage Month for the last several years, the House of Repre-
sentatives (House) has characterized the Chinese Exclusion Act as one of sev-
eral “injustices faced by Asian American . . . communities throughout United 
States history.”216 In a concurrent Senate and House resolution to “condemn all 
prejudice against individuals of Asian and Pacific Island ancestry in the United 
States,” Congress characterized the Chinese Exclusion Act as a discriminatory 
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law.217 Congress further encouraged executive agencies to act in “accordance 
with existing civil rights laws” and asserted that individuals of Asian ancestry 
were entitled to due process rights.218 
2. The Supreme Court 
Besides its relative silence on the contours of the plenary power in recent 
decisions, the Supreme Court has distanced itself from The Chinese Exclusion 
Case through both the frequency and the manner in which the Court cites the 
case. Supreme Court Justices have cited The Chinese Exclusion Case in major-
ity, concurring, or dissenting opinions more than thirty times since the Court 
issued the decision in 1889.219 All but one of those references occurred prior to 
1978.220 Besides a few cases that cite to The Chinese Exclusion Case for a 
statutory interpretation or treaty-related issue, every pre-1978 citation charac-
terized The Chinese Exclusion Case as standing for Congress’s broad authority 
to legislate immigration law.221 For example, in Boutilier v. INS, the 1967 
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Court opinion cited The Chinese Exclusion Case in asserting that “[i]t has long 
been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission 
of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Con-
gress has forbidden.”222 Similarly, in the Supreme Court’s 1972 case 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, a dissenting opinion relied on The Chinese Exclusion 
Case in asserting that “Congress . . . ha[s] the power to exclude any class of 
aliens from these shores.”223 Other formulations of the Court’s pre-1978 char-
acterization of The Chinese Exclusion Case were similarly broad.224 
That the Court would characterize The Chinese Exclusion Case as stand-
ing for sweepingly broad authority to regulate immigration with few constitu-
tional restraints is unremarkable to anyone familiar with The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case itself. What is remarkable, however, is that (a) the Court has only 
cited to the case once since 1977, a marked departure from an earlier period 
when it cited the case thirty times, (b) the Court has never cited The Chinese 
Exclusion Case after the events of September 11, 2001, and (c) despite the 
Court considering the merits of over a dozen cases in which the government 
brief relied on The Chinese Exclusion Case,225 the Court’s only recent citation 
to the case occurred in its 2001 opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis.226 The Court’s 
use of the case was anything but typical relative to its thirty prior citations. The 
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Court characterized The Chinese Exclusion Case as a limit on congressional 
power to regulate immigration rather than the affirmation of sweeping grant of 
authority for which it has historically stood. 
In Zadvydas, the Court considered a habeas petition that a noncitizen in 
immigration detention filed.227 An immigration court had found him remova-
ble, but no country would accept him.228 The relevant statute allowed the At-
torney General to detain noncitizens indefinitely pending deportation.229 Indef-
inite detention, the Court opined, would be unconstitutional.230 In the majority 
opinion, Justice Breyer cited to The Chinese Exclusion Case to support the 
assertion that congressional authority in immigration is “limited ‘by the Con-
stitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, 
more or less the conduct of all civilized nations.’”231 This characterization of 
The Chinese Exclusion Case is a vast departure from prior references and is 
puzzling in light of the actual holding and result of The Chinese Exclusion 
Case. A more typical depiction of The Chinese Exclusion Case appeared only 
in Justice Scalia’s Zadvydas dissent.232 The majority’s recharacterization points 
to the accumulation of dark matter pulling against The Chinese Exclusion 
Case’s actual holding. 
The Supreme Court issued the Zadvydas opinion on June 28, 2001, less 
than three months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.233 The tide 
of public opinion regarding immigration would turn drastically in the wake of 
the attacks.234 But the Supreme Court did not subsequently include any reference 
to The Chinese Exclusion Case in its opinions on the merits even though the 
government raised it in its briefs to the Court on at least four occasions.235 
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Even when the Supreme Court considered the Trump administration’s ul-
timate executive order banning citizens of several predominately Muslim 
countries from entering the United States, the Court did not raise the plenary 
power doctrine.236 Rather, the majority held that President Trump’s order was 
not based on religion and therefore avoided the entire question of whether, and 
to what extent, the Court’s usual approach to Establishment Clause challenges 
applied in the immigration context.237 
3. The President 
The executive branch of the federal government has also acted as if The 
Chinese Exclusion Case is no longer controlling. Even at the time of the repeal 
of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, President Roosevelt expressed doubts 
over whether the Act was consistent with constitutional principles. In an ad-
dress before Congress, he described the Act as an “anachronism[] in our law,” 
a “mistake,” and an “injustice” that was “long overdue” for correction.238 
Fast forward to the twenty-first century. Presidential statements about The 
Chinese Exclusion Case or plenary power in general demonstrate significant 
doubts about the case’s viability today. President Obama referred to the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act as part of a “long history of injustice” and celebrated the 
Act’s repeal in proclamations related to the celebration of Asian American and 
Pacific Islander Heritage Month.239 
Most interesting, perhaps, are President Trump’s statements and actions 
leading up to his signing of the executive order banning immigration from five 
predominantly Muslim countries.240 During his campaign for the presidency, 
then-candidate Trump promised to ban the entry of Muslims.241 His issued or-
der, however, did not refer to any faith or religion, but rather to specific coun-
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tries.242 Why did he not specifically refer to Muslim noncitizens in his order? 
His advisers feared that courts would invalidate the order as unconstitutional. 
In fact, news outlets reported on a conversation between President Trump and 
former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani in which President Trump said he 
wanted a “Muslim ban” but he wanted to know how to do it legally.243 Giuliani 
explained that advisers intentionally framed the order to target nations that 
posed national security threats rather than individuals’ religious affiliation to 
pass legal muster.244 
Giuliani’s explanation is significant in light of my prior discussion of ple-
nary power—The Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny, all of which remain 
on the books today, suggest that the President and/or Congress may indeed 
have authority to categorially bar entry of noncitizens based on religion. If 
President Trump and his advisers believed that The Chinese Exclusion Case 
and early plenary power cases were still good law, they likely would not have 
been concerned over specifically referencing religion. Dark matter, however, 
informed their decision to avoid the mention of religion. 
In light of the relevant actors’ behavior in the realm of plenary power, it is 
inaccurate to describe The Chinese Exclusion Case and the virtually limitless 
depiction of plenary power that it represents as “good law.” When actors ap-
pear to deliberately shape their behavior to distance themselves from a case, 
they are responding to dark matter that pulls against the weight of the case. 
The plenary power doctrine is no longer merely a function of the ordinary mat-
ter of law. It is also a function of any dark matter that surrounds it. 
C. Why Is The Chinese Exclusion Case Still on the Books? 
Given the accumulation of dark matter in this area, it is tempting to rele-
gate The Chinese Exclusion Case to the “anticanon” of American constitution-
al law, a collection of now-obsolete cases that serve as cautionary tales in ju-
risprudence. After all, the two cases that scholars most readily recognize as part 
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?utm_term=.db7a72fc1baf [https://perma.cc/PVB9-L8TQ]. 
 244 Id. Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani stated: 
And what we did was, we focused on, instead of religion, danger—the areas of the 
world that create danger for us . . . . [w]hich is a factual basis, not a religious basis. Per-
fectly legal, perfectly sensible. And that’s what the ban is based on. It’s not based on re-
ligion. It’s based on places where there are substantial evidence that people are sending 
terrorists into our country. 
Id. 
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of the anticanon, the Supreme Court’s 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson245 
and its 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,246 espouse repugnant race-
based classifications similar to the type upheld in The Chinese Exclusion Case. 
But The Chinese Exclusion Case does not fit neatly in the anticanon’s curio 
cabinet of extinct but venomous laws. 
Many scholars have discussed the anticanon.247 Though there is not per-
fect agreement on all of the cases that make up the anticanon, there is consen-
sus on what the anticanon represents. 248 The anticanon includes cases that are 
recognized as no longer good law, usually because they have been overturned, 
but are so fundamentally inimical to a modern understanding of the constitu-
tion that we—legal scholars and commentators—cannot look away.249 We cite 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (upholding the “separate but equal” 
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 248 See Greene, Anticanon, supra note 247, at 388–90 (arguing that there is consensus on only 
four cases—Dred Scott, the Supreme Court’s 1896 opinion Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner, and the 
Supreme Court’s 1944 case Korematsu v. United States). 
 249 See id. at 386–87. 
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to them as examples of how a legal system can go awry.250 Professor Jamal 
Greene argues that cases in the anticanon have three features, one of which 
requires that a case be overturned to be anticanonical.251 
The Chinese Exclusion Case is firmly outside the ambit of the anticanon, 
although it wields much less influence than it once did. Anticanon cases occu-
py pages in law reviews, not as legitimate sources of law, but as artifacts of a 
darker time.252 In contrast, textbooks cite The Chinese Exclusion Case as the 
foundation of immigration law rather than a ghost of past law.253 In law re-
views, the case elicits criticism and calls for its overturning rather than reflec-
tions on its historical significance.254 Anticanon cases are recognized as bad 
law; in fact, when the Supreme Court cites them, it does so negatively.255 The 
Court no longer cites The Chinese Exclusion Case, and its most recent citation 
twenty years ago in Zadvydas was a positive citation for a proposition that is in 
tension with The Chinese Exclusion Case’s very holding.256 The Supreme 
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 255 Greene, Anticanon, supra note 247, at 397–98. 
 256 See supra Part III.B.2. 
2021] Dark Matter in the Law 1595 
Court has legally repudiated anticanon cases.257 The Chinese Exclusion Case 
has escaped legal elimination.258 
Rather, The Chinese Exclusion Case—and the principle it stands for—is 
in a state of suspended animation. It is, to put it in more vivid terms, in deep 
freeze under a layer of permafrost. As such, The Chinese Exclusion Case is 
unlikely to exert much influence on the modern development of the law. Ironi-
cally, though, the very permafrost that insulates the law from The Chinese Ex-
clusion Case’s influence also insulates the case itself from reexamination. Un-
less a legal actor attempts to exhume and defrost it, The Chinese Exclusion 
Case may never see the light of day. The Chinese Exclusion Case’s persistence 
“on the books” despite actors’ mistrust of its validity provides an interesting 
case study of the conditions under which dark matter is likely to accumulate. 
Here, dark matter operates to counteract The Chinese Exclusion Case’s hold-
ing. To mix metaphors, dark matter has slowly frozen the case and accumulat-
ed over the top of it. 
So what makes a case susceptible to this deep freeze? What factors lead to 
the accumulation of dark matter to counteract and yet preserve a case’s hold-
ing? The Chinese Exclusion Case’s state of suspended animation is a function 
of three factors. Subsection 1 discusses the case’s foundational role in the field 
of immigration law.259 Subsection 2 addresses its consistency with then-
accepted cultural and legal norms.260 Subsection 3 focuses on the large gaps in 
time between instances of Court re-evaluation. 261 
1. Foundational Role 
The Chinese Exclusion Case is more than an outdated expression of xen-
ophobia and racism, though it is indeed that. The case plays an important 
foundational role in immigration law because it established the federal gov-
ernment’s authority to regulate immigration law to the exclusion of any state 
efforts in that field. 262 Moreover, in its opinion, the Court anchored the power 
to regulate immigration law to pre-constitutional sovereignty rather than to a 
specific text in the Constitution.263 In essence, then, The Chinese Exclusion 
                                                                                                                           
 257 See, e.g., Case, supra note 247, at 1469 n.112 (noting that the modern Court employs antiprec-
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 261 See infra Part III.C.3. 
 262 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
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Case is the written expression of law upon which all of immigration law rests. 
There is no constitutional anchor separate from the case. 
Accordingly, overturning The Chinese Exclusion Case would call into 
question the origin of Congress’s authority and undermine the established un-
derstanding of immigration law. Although this is certainly something the Su-
preme Court could do, the Court is unlikely to do so even if it has the choice. 
Dark matter gives the Court an option: instead of overturning a foundational 
case, the Court can simply rely on dark matter to constrain behavior. 
2. Consistency with Then-Contemporary Cultural and Legal Norms 
The norms in place when the Court decided The Chinese Exclusion Case 
also play a role. Overturning a case is easiest when the case can be accurately 
described as wrongly decided in the first place. If a case is clearly consistent 
with the cultural and legal norms of its time, overturning the case requires 
recognition that the law has changed. The risk of recognizing a change in the 
law is heightened when the case at issue plays a foundational role in an area of 
law, as described above. In addition, a case consistent with extant norms is 
more likely to be repeatedly cited over time in ways that incrementally ignore 
the repugnant aspects of the case while preserving core concepts.264 The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case was consistent with the legal norms of the time—as Pro-
fessor Chin has described in his scholarship, Asians experienced discriminato-
ry laws and treatment across all areas of the law during the era of Chinese ex-
clusion.265 
Professor Greene has recognized this factor—a case being consistent with 
the legal and cultural norms of its time—as one characteristic of the anticanon 
of American jurisprudence.266 The anticanon cases are no longer good law but 
are repeatedly cited as counter-examples and comparison cases throughout le-
gal commentary and in modern Supreme Court opinions.267 One way to think 
of dark matter, then, is as the substance that ultimately results in a case’s rele-
gation to the anticanon. The Chinese Exclusion Case may never be overturned 
and thereby become a part of the anticanon because dark matter has already 
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changed behavior sufficiently to undermine the necessity of overturning the 
case itself. 
3. Passage of Time 
The longer a case remains on the books, the longer it is likely to remain 
on the books. Dark matter has a reinforcing effect after a certain tipping point. 
If dark matter doesn’t result in a case being overturned, then it simply obscures 
the case and undermines its validity until it quietly fades away. This is why the 
chances of The Chinese Exclusion Case being overturned are slim. It would 
take a highly aberrational law or executive order to provide the impetus for over-
turning the case. Congress and the President are unlikely to enact or announce 
such a law, although the travel ban—and the resulting 2018 Supreme Court opin-
ion in Trump v. Hawaii—comes as close as we have seen in decades.268 
IV. DARK MATTER OUTSIDE THE PLENARY POWER UNIVERSE 
My discussion of dark matter and its interaction with the ordinary matter 
of law may seem, so far, quite particular to The Chinese Exclusion Case and 
immigration law’s plenary power doctrine. That context admittedly gave rise to 
my thesis that informal norms could significantly weaken formal norms while 
simultaneously insulating those formal norms from modification or rescission. 
This phenomenon, however, is neither unique to constitutional immigration 
law nor to areas of law that are governed primarily by case law. It is not even 
unique to areas of law governed by public law. Dark matter norms can arise in 
any area of law to weaken and displace the ordinary matter of law. 
To limit the scope of my paper, I do not catalog every potential example 
or type of example of this phenomenon. Instead, I focus here on two additional 
case studies, both of them based on Supreme Court decisions.269 These exam-
ples illustrate the operation of the three factors discussed in Part III.C in two 
new contexts. 
The first case study, outlined in Part IV.A, highlights the 1944 opinion in 
Korematsu v. United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld an executive 
order that Japanese Americans be removed from their homes and housed in 
internment camps during World War II.270 Like The Chinese Exclusion Case, 
Korematsu’s reputation is, at best, tainted. Scholars have thoroughly rejected 
and criticized the case.271 Until the 2018 Supreme Court decision in Trump v. 
Hawaii, Korematsu was on a trajectory similar to that of The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case. In Trump v. Hawaii, however, the Supreme Court suggested that 
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Korematsu is no longer good law.272 Chief Justice Roberts explicitly rejected 
Korematsu in his opinion even though it was unrelated to the Trump executive 
order at issue, and therefore may have been purposefully avoiding the very 
issue he saw looming in Trump v. Hawaii: how could the Court reject and re-
pudiate ordinary matter that is insulated by dark matter norms before that ordi-
nary matter is invoked and revived? Without Chief Justice Roberts’s express 
repudiation that moved the case towards the anticanon, Korematsu had all the 
markings of a precedent that would remain insulated from review for the long 
term as described in Part III.C.273 Korematsu’s relative youth, as compared to 
The Chinese Exclusion Case, and its less significant foundational role, likely 
explain the diverging trajectory. 
My second case study highlights ordinary matter that, while insulated by 
dark matter from review, is unlikely to be revived or invoked in a way that is in 
tension with the dark matter that surrounds it. In the much-reviled 1927 opin-
ion of Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court upheld the forced sterilization of a 
woman.274 The case has never been overturned. In contrast to The Chinese Ex-
clusion Case and Korematsu, Buck is missing some of the hallmarks that I de-
scribed in Part III.C.275 
Besides further illustrating the way dark matter may or may not insulate 
ordinary matter’s staying power, these case studies also usefully illustrate dif-
ferent legal actors’ responsiveness to dark matter, which sets the stage for Part 
V of this Article. I begin with Korematsu in Section A,276 and Buck follows in 
Section B.277 
A. Korematsu v. United States 
Korematsu needs no introduction.278 Lawyers and law students recognize 
Korematsu as a stain on American history. It was the lever that allowed the 
U.S. government to intern Japanese Americans in “Relocation Centers” far 
from their homes based on nothing more than their race.279 Like The Chinese 
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Exclusion Case, Korematsu has lurked under the surface of a heavy layer of 
dark matter. Unlike The Chinese Exclusion Case, though, the Supreme Court 
recently seized an opportunity to discredit it following decades of silence. Ko-
rematsu’s trajectory illustrates the difficulty of revisiting ordinary matter that 
no longer serves as the primary constraint on behavior, as well as the risk of 
that ordinary matter resurfacing. 
In 1942, Fred Toyasaburo Korematsu was arrested and convicted for fail-
ure to comply with an order to leave his home, as required by an “Exclusion 
Order” authorizing the Secretary of War to remove people of Japanese ancestry 
from designated military areas.280 The Supreme Court upheld Korematsu’s 
conviction.281 In doing so, the Court found that the executive order at issue, 
though “immediately suspect” because it “curtail[ed] the civil rights of a single 
racial group,” was nonetheless within the war powers of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive war powers.282 
The decision quickly slid into the background as dark matter accumulated 
around it. Subsection 1 below discusses the dark matter around the Korematsu 
decision.283 Subsection 2 explores the divergent paths of Korematsu and The 
Chinese Exclusion Case.284 
1. Dark Matter Surrounding Korematsu 
Since the Supreme Court’s 1944 opinion, Korematsu has been almost 
universally deserted by scholars, commentators, and legal actors alike. This 
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evidences significant dark matter pulling against Korematsu’s weight. Here, I 
focus on the three branches of the federal government to illustrate the exist-
ence of dark matter that conflicts with the holding of Korematsu, beginning in 
subsection a with Congress.285 Subsection b discusses the Supreme Court,286 
and subsection c examines the executive.287 
a. Congress 
Congress has repeatedly indicated its rejection of Korematsu. Less than 
ten years after Korematsu brought his case to the Supreme Court, Congress 
passed an Act to compensate Japanese American government employees who 
had received pay cuts or demotions during the internment era.288 In 1988, 
Congress passed an act formally apologizing for the internment of Japanese 
Americans.289 The Act pardoned individuals who, like Korematsu, had violated 
the executive orders.290 Moreover, it provided twenty thousand dollars as com-
pensation to each Japanese American who had been interned (or their surviving 
immediate family members)291 and allocated funds for research and education-
al programs about Japanese American evacuation, relocation, and intern-
ment.292 Lastly, the Act made documents relating to Japanese American in-
ternment publicly available.293 
More recently, Congress passed several acts and resolutions to memorial-
ize Japanese American relocation and internment. For example, in 2004, the 
House addressed a resolution to acknowledge a “National Day of Remem-
brance” of those interned during World War II.294 In 2005, the Senate passed a 
resolution honoring Fred Korematsu295 and Congress passed a bill to preserve 
“the historic confinement sites,” or relocation centers, where Japanese Ameri-
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cans were sent during WWII.296 In 2016, a Senate resolution resolved to re-
member the lessons learned from Korematsu.297 Finally, in 2017, both the Sen-
ate and the House passed resolutions acknowledging January 30 as “Fred Ko-
rematsu Day of Civil Liberties and the Constitution.”298 
b. The Supreme Court 
The strongest judicial repudiation of Korematsu is embodied in Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, and so I begin there. Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote: 
 Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, 
Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation 
of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the 
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presi-
dential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repug-
nant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign na-
tionals the privilege of admission. The entry suspension is an act 
that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by 
any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of 
this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Procla-
mation. 
 The dissent’s reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court 
the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu 
was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the 
court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the 
Constitution.”299 
Chief Justice Roberts’s passage was the culmination of decades of Su-
preme Court discomfort and reimagining of Korematsu. In the seventy-five 
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years since the Korematsu decision, only twenty-four Supreme Court majority 
opinions have cited the majority opinion in Korematsu.300 
The Court has instead relied on Korematsu, rather counterintuitively, as a 
standard for protection of minority groups. Most of the Court’s citations to Ko-
rematsu cite it as precedent for the proposition that national origin and race-
based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.301 In much the same way that 
The Chinese Exclusion Case was most recently cited in a Supreme Court opin-
ion for a proposition that is almost diametrically opposed to its overall holding 
and significance, Korematsu has been reimagined and re-molded to be con-
sistent with the dark matter that has accumulated around it. 
This rejection and reimaging of Korematsu has occurred despite repeated 
efforts to use Korematsu to justify government action. The government has 
cited Korematsu in its briefs before the Supreme Court at least forty times.302 
                                                                                                                           
 300 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 
(2013); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995) (plurality opinion); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Pena, 515 
U.S. 200; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279 (1987); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 
495 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in 
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& Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. 
v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948). 
 301 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351–52 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 n.8 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; 
Mathews, 427 U.S. 495; Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677; Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56; Richardson, 403 U.S. 365; 
Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618; Hunter, 393 U.S. 385; Loving, 388 U.S. 1; McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184; Bolling, 
347 U.S. 497; Hurd, 334 U.S. 24. 
 302 See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 13, Ashcroft v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (No. 15-
1359), 2017 WL 117334; Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 7, Ashcroft v. Turkmen, 137 S. Ct. 293 
(2016) (No. 15-1359), 2016 WL 4487705; Reply Brief for Petitioners Dennis Hasty and James Sher-
man at 10, Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (No. 15-1363), 2017 WL 167314; Brief Amicus Curiae of U.S. 
Senator Arlen Specter in Support of Petitioners at 10, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 
(Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2441578; Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 38, Hamdi, 
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2003 WL 23189498; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 13, Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. 547 (No. 89-453), 1989 WL 1126975; Brief 
for the United States passim, United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987) (No. 86-510), 1987 WL 
880429 (citing to Korematsu while defending against a civil suit brought by nineteen former Japanese 
internees); Reply Brief for the United States passim, Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (No. 86-510), 1987 WL 
880442; Reply Brief for the United States at 9, 13 n.10, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 
(No. 86-87), 1987 WL 880539; Brief for the United States at 17, Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (No. 86-87), 
1986 WL 727530; Brief for the Respondents at 33 n.15, Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (No. 84-
5240), 1985 WL 670051; Appellee’s Brief on the Merits at 36 n.17, Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 
(1982) (No. 80-2165), 1981 WL 390301; Brief for the Petitioner at 18, 27 n.20, Haig v. Agee, 453 
2021] Dark Matter in the Law 1603 
The Court cited Korematsu in its majority opinion in only nine of those cas-
es.303 Only one of those, the Court’s 1952 case of Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. 280 (1981) (No. 80-83), 1980 WL 339656 (citing to Korematsu to support the proposition that 
wartime exigencies can prompt restrictions on liberty that would be impermissible in peacetime); 
Brief for the Petitioner at 18, 27 n.20, Muskie v. Agee, 449 U.S. 818 (1980) (No. 80-83), 1980 WL 
339656; Brief for the United States at 19 n.28, United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 667 F.2d 1105 
(4th Cir. 1981) (Nos. 76-5176, 78-5177), 1979 WL 212414; Brief for the Petitioners at 31 n.31, Kis-
singer v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (No. 79-880), 1980 WL 339266; Brief for Respondents at 48 
n.194, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Nos. 78-432, 78-435, 78-436), 
1979 WL 199727; Brief for Respondent at 55 n.52, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 
187993; Brief for the United States at 24, Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (No. 73-1869), 
1975 WL 173739; Brief for the United States at 20, Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) (No. 
72-5323), 1973 WL 172344; Brief for the Appellees at 15 n.11, 18 n.14, Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973) (No. 71-1694), 1972 WL 137566; Brief for the United States at 30 n.48, United States v. Scot-
land Neck City Bd. Of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972) (Nos. 70-130, 70-187), 1971 WL 133501 (citing to 
Korematsu to contend that state governments must satisfy a heavy burden to justify state action that is 
based on a suspect classification); Brief for the Respondent at 191, Communist Party of the U.S. v. 
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (No. 12), 1960 WL 98819; Brief for the United 
States at 39, Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (No. 668), 1958 WL 91915; Brief for the 
Respondent at 35, Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958) (No. 621), 1958 WL 92037; Brief for the 
United States at 40, Heikkinen v. United States, 355 U.S. 273 (1958) (No. 89), 1957 WL 87075; Brief 
for the United States at 29, Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957) (No. 132), 1956 WL 89217; 
Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument at 23–24, 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5), 1953 WL 48699; Brief for the Appellee 
at 64, 74 n.38, Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 
(1954) (No. 195), 1954 WL 73405; Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument at 140, 
Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (No. 1), 1953 WL 78291; Brief for the Respondent Shaughnessy at 10, 38, 
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (No. 17), 1952 WL 82372; Brief for the United States at 35, 
United States v. Carroll, 345 U.S. 457 (1953) (No. 442), 1953 WL 78383; Brief for Respondents at 
21–22, Bolling, 347 U.S. 497 (No. 8), 1952 WL 47280; Brief for the United States at 23 n.8, United 
States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (No. 16), 1952 WL 82369 (citing Korematsu in 
support of the statement that the Supreme Court had previously upheld substantial restrictions on the 
liberty of American citizens); Brief for the United States at 93, Harisiades, 342 U.S. 580 (Nos. 43, 
206, 264), 1951 WL 81966; Brief for the United States at 232–33, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494 (1951) (No. 336), 1950 WL 78653; Brief for Appellee at 14, 64, 97, 100, Am. Commc’ns Ass’n 
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (Nos. 10, 13), 1949 WL 50660; Brief for Respondents at 21, 
Takahashi, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (No. 533), 1948 WL 47430; Consolidated Brief for Petitioners at 117, 
Hurd, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (Nos. 290, 291), 1947 WL 44429; Consolidated Reply Brief for Petitioners 
at 16 n.17, Hurd, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (Nos. 290, 291), 1948 WL 47573; Brief for the United States at 
59, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (Nos. 14, 15), 1945 WL 48869; Brief for the United 
States at 40, Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (Nos. 78-160, 78-161), 1979 WL 
199253; Brief for the Appellant at 47, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Nos. 2, 
3), 1961 WL 101711. 
 303 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 2650 (citing to Justice Murphy’s 
dissent in Korematsu, which argued that courts have the authority to review military decisions to see if 
the armed forces overstepped their discretion); Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 564 n.12 (disputing 
Justice Kennedy’s invocation of Korematsu as an example of “benign” suspect classifications); Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 287, 291–92, 299 (citing to Korematsu to contend that not all suspect classifications are 
unconstitutional, but that courts must subject them to stringent judicial scrutiny); Frontiero, 411 U.S. 
at 682 n.9 (citing to Korematsu to note that suspect classifications are subject to judicial scrutiny); 
Bolling, 357 U.S. at 499 n.3; Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589 n.16, 520 n.17; Takahashi, 344 U.S. at 413, 
418; Hurd, 334 U.S. at 30. 
1604 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1555 
like Korematsu, was decided in the government’s favor.304 In dozens of addi-
tional cases before the Court, the preceding courts of appeals opinions cited 
Korematsu,305 with only a handful of the subsequent Supreme Court opinions 
including the citation.306 
Even when the Court has issued opinions that uphold government action, 
the Court has gone to great lengths to avoid citing Korematsu. In Trump v. 
Hawaii, the very same opinion in which he unequivocally rejected Korematsu, 
Chief Justice Roberts relied on Harisiades, one of only two cases to cite Ko-
rematsu for expansion of federal power.307 The principles from Harisiades that 
Chief Justice Roberts relied on to uphold President Trump’s executive order 
come from Korematsu.308 In other words, Chief Justice Roberts utilized tenets 
that came out of Korematsu, but he chose to cite an indirect precedent instead. 
Dissenting Justices have been increasingly reluctant to rely on Korematsu 
for expanding federal power. In two early cases where the majority held for 
non-governmental parties, dissenting Justices Clark and Jackson cited Kore-
matsu in their arguments that military and defense establishments are rarely, if 
ever, subject to judicial review.309 Since 1961, however, even dissenting opin-
ions have stopped citing Korematsu as a standard for expanded federal power. 
Instead, one dissenting opinion recognized and gave a nod to the dark matter 
surrounding Korematsu. In 1993, in Reno v. Flores, Justice Stevens, in dissent, 
wrote that although the majority’s opinion in favor of the attorney general was 
                                                                                                                           
 304 See 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952). 
 305 See, e.g., Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (noting that the Supreme Court first announced the strict scrutiny standard in Korematsu); 
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 113 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (contending 
that the majority upholding the Department of Correction’s denial of gender reassignment surgery 
would one day be viewed like Korematsu and other notorious decisions); Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 
313, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing to Korematsu and noting that Fred Korematsu and others had their 
convictions for violating internment orders vacated after it later emerged that the government had 
“misrepresented and suppressed evidence” that would demonstrate that racial animus, not military 
necessity, spurred the internments); Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(citing to Korematsu as an example of national origin being a suspect classification). 
 306 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013); Seattle Sch. Dist, No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (plurality opinion); Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Richardson, 430 U.S. 365; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 
742 (1948). 
 307 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418 (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately 
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations [and] the war 
power.” (quoting Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89) (alterations in original)). 
 308 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89 (“It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is 
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign 
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are 
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial 
inquiry or interference.”). 
 309 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 516 (1959) (Clark, J., dissenting); Terminiello v. City of 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 34 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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similar to Korematsu, he understood their hesitation about utilizing the case 
even though it was still on the books.310 Justice Stevens pointed to a number of 
factors, including the absence of an ongoing war and Congress’s apology for 
Japanese internment, as explanations for the Court’s unwillingness to treat Ko-
rematsu as good law.311 
Beyond the Court’s express rejection (without formal overturning) of, de-
liberate silence on, and reimagining of Korematsu, there are additional indica-
tors of dark matter within the judiciary. In the twenty-nine Senate confirmation 
hearings after Korematsu that resulted in Supreme Court Justice appointments, 
no one has expressed affirmative support for Japanese American internment.312 
In many of those hearings, the nominees have instead expressed disdain for the 
holding of Korematsu.313 They have denounced Korematsu by agreeing with 
statements that Korematsu was a “tragic decision,”314 a “great constitutional 
traged[y],”315 “wrongly decided,”316 and not “applicable precedent for the Court 
to consider,”317 and by praising Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu.318 
                                                                                                                           
 310 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 344 n.30 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 311 Id. 
 312 There have been thirty Supreme Court Justices appointed since 1944, but one Justice, Harold 
Hitz Burton, did not have a Senate hearing. Andrew Glass, Truman Nominates GOP Senator to Su-
preme Court, Sept. 18, 1945, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/18/
truman-nominates-gop-senator-to-supreme-court-sept-18-1945-242739 [https://perma.cc/36HB-P6D7]. 
He was unanimously confirmed the day after his nomination without a hearing. Id. 
 313 It is unclear at what point Korematsu became the byword for unconstitutional oppression. It 
seems that it was not considered wrong in the years immediately after it was decided, but it has be-
come tainted over time. In fact, Justice Tom Campbell Clark’s former 1942 employment as “Coordi-
nator of Alien Property Control of the Western Defense Command and Chief of Civilian Staff for 
Japanese War Relocation” did not preclude his confirmation in 1949. See Nomination of Tom C. 
Clark, of Texas, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 3 (1949) (listing that title under then-Judge Clark’s 
“[e]xperience”). Neither did Justice Earl Warren’s position as Attorney General in California during 
the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast preclude his confirmation in 1986. David 
Alan Sklansky, Japanese Internment Case Not “Good Law,” STANFORD L. SCH.: LEGAL AGGREGATE 
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/11/18/korematsu-is-not-good-law/ [https://perma.cc/
N88X-WVKH]. 
 314 The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 209–10 (1993). 
 315 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
418 (2006). 
 316 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 117 (2009). 
 317 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. 226 (2017). 
 318 Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 225–27 (1994) (“I have rather 
always admired Justice Murphy’s opinion.”). 
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Notably, despite his strong language in Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice 
Roberts is the only Supreme Court nominee who hesitated when asked about 
Korematsu during his Senate confirmation hearing. In response to a question 
about Korematsu, he pointed out that it had not “technically been over-
ruled.”319 Perhaps recognizing the tension between existing dark matter and the 
ordinary matter of the case’s holding, he explained, “it’s widely recognized as 
not having precedential value.”320 He further opined that the legal arguments 
justifying Korematsu are impermissible now.321 
Furthermore, Justice Kavanaugh, whose Senate confirmation hearings oc-
curred after Chief Justice Roberts penned Trump v. Hawaii, grappled with the 
significance of Chief Justice Roberts’s rejection of Korematsu during his hear-
ings. He explained that the Supreme Court took an opportunity to note that a 
precedential case was no longer good law, even though Trump v. Hawaii did 
not raise a question that directly implicated Korematsu.322 
c. The President 
Relative to Congress and the Supreme Court, U.S. presidents have been 
more ambivalent toward Korematsu. The executive branch relied on the Kore-
matsu ruling to justify, for example, presidential power to block Iranian assets 
or halt transactions with Iranian nationals in 1980.323 Since President Reagan 
signed a bill apologizing to Japanese Americans in 1988,324 however, presi-
dents from both political parties have generally distanced themselves from Ko-
rematsu. In 1998, President Clinton awarded Fred Korematsu the Presidential 
Medal of Freedom.325 On January 17, 2001, President Bush issued a proclama-
tion establishing a monument at the former Minidoka Relocation Center in 
south central Idaho.326 In press briefings, President Bush’s press representa-
                                                                                                                           
 319 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 241 (2005). 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Sen. Hirono at Kavanaugh Hearing, C-SPAN (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/
?c4748146/sen-hirono-kavanaugh hearing [https://perma.cc/43BH-VNUF]. 
 323 Presidential Powers Relating to the Situation in Iran, 4 Op. O.L.C. 115, 115–20 (1979) (ad-
dressing potential responses to the seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran). 
 324 Katherine Bishop, Day of Apology and ‘Sigh of Relief,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1988), http://
www.nytimes.com/1988/08/11/us/day-of-apology-and-sigh-of-relief.html [https://perma.cc/528H-
GMVS] (describing “President Reagan’s signing of legislation that provides for payments and apolo-
gies to Japanese-Americans who were forcibly relocated in World War II”). 
 325 Fred Korematsu Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, C-SPAN (Mar. 14, 2017), https://
www.c-span.org/video/?c4660995/fred-korematsu-awarded-presidential-medal-freedom [https://perma.
cc/A9J7-M7CQ] (providing video clip of Bill Clinton at the Presidential Medal of Freedom Awards 
on January 15, 1998). 
 326 Proclamation No. 7395, 66 Fed. Reg. 7347 (Jan. 17, 2001) (entitled “Establishment of the 
Minidoka Internment Monument”). 
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tives repeatedly refused to rely on the Korematsu decision to justify executive 
actions such as a military order establishing parameters for the detention and 
trials of terrorists, and the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, even 
though Korematsu remained on the books.327 On May 20, 2011, under President 
Obama’s administration, the Solicitor General’s office issued a public “confes-
sion of error” regarding its involvement in the Korematsu decision.328 The 
written confession remains on the office’s website today.329 
President Trump took a different approach to Korematsu. In defending his 
originally proposed ban on the entry of Muslims into the United States, he ex-
plained, “Take a look at what F.D.R. did many years ago. He did the same 
thing.”330 This, of course, was likely a reference to Japanese internment. The 
possibility that an executive—in this case, the President—may be less con-
strained by dark matter and may revive long-rejected ordinary matter is more 
fully explored in Part V below.331 Here, it is enough to note that dark matter is 
never a guarantee that formal law is no longer relevant, especially when a 
member of the executive branch is willing to revive that ordinary matter. 
2. Twin Trajectories: Korematsu and The Chinese Exclusion Case 
In many ways, Korematsu and its subsequent treatment parallels that of 
The Chinese Exclusion Case. Like The Chinese Exclusion Case, Korematsu is 
widely rejected. Both cases survived into the twenty-first century without be-
ing overturned. Korematsu, however, has sustained what is likely a fatal blow. 
Chief Justice Roberts unequivocally crossed Korematsu off the map.332 Wheth-
er Korematsu as a formal matter has been eliminated—whether its star, howev-
er obscured by dark matter and absent from the map of precedent, has actually 
disappeared—is debatable.333 Korematsu was, after all, not directly at issue in 
                                                                                                                           
 327 The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Scott McClellan (June 16, 2005), https://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050616-5.html [https://perma.cc/
T6N5-EDY3]; The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Ari Fleischer (Nov. 19, 2001), 
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 328 Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American In-
ternment Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/
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[https://perma.cc/T4AP-9AAW]. The public confessional was issued by Neal Katyal, the Acting So-
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 329 Id. 
 330 Adam Liptak, Travel Ban Case Is Shadowed by One of Supreme Court’s Darkest Moments, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/us/politics/travel-ban-japanese-
internment-trump-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/8CME-4UWJ]. 
 331 See infra Part V. 
 332 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (emphasizing that Korematsu was an 
erroneous decision in 1944 and still is today). 
 333 Erwin Chemerinsky, Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be Repeated, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 163, 172 (2011); Greene, Anticanon, supra note 247, at 422–27, 456–60; Katyal, 
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Trump v. Hawaii. But any litigator, court, or President who relies on Kore-
matsu is extremely unlikely to find support and may instead trigger a swift 
overturning in the Supreme Court. Why has Korematsu’s trajectory led to such 
a blatant and obvious rejection when The Chinese Exclusion Case has escaped 
mention, and therefore lingers behind dark matter? The answer lies in the dif-
ferences between the two cases with respect to the factors I identified in Part 
III.C, and which I discuss in detail below.334 Subsection a compares the cases’ 
foundational roles. Subsection b assesses the cases’ consistency with then-
contemporaneous law.335 Lastly, subsection c analyzes the impact of their age.336 
a. Foundational Role 
The Korematsu opinion includes the first articulation of the strict scrutiny 
standard for constitutional review.337 The Supreme Court has cited Korematsu 
for this proposition more than seventeen times338 while noting that Korematsu is 
one of only two cases to have passed the strict scrutiny test.339 Because it is the 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 35, at 641–56; A. Reid Monroe-Sheridan, “Frankly Unthinkable”: The Constitutional 
Failings of President Trump’s Proposed Muslim Registry, 70 ME. L. REV. 1, 32 (2017); Serrano & 
Minami, supra note 279, at 47; Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties 
in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 307. 
 334 See supra Part III.C. 
 335 See infra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 336 See infra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 337 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (noting that the strict-scrutiny test “was first enunciated in Korematsu”). In Korematsu, Justice 
Black wrote: 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions 
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. 
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; ra-
cial antagonism never can. 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018). Compare this to Justice Murphy’s dissent characterizing the majority opinion as the 
“legalization of racism.” Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting); Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Kore-
matsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
29, 31 (2005). 
 338 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 n.10 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 n.9 
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judi-
cial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1277 (2007) (“It would surely also be misleading to say that the 
Court began applying strict scrutiny in Korematsu, which upheld a race-based classification based on 
uncertain evidence, even though Korematsu contains language that would later be cited to support the 
modem form of strict scrutiny review.”). 
 339 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 307 (2013); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 
U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Pow-
ell, J. concurring); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 n. 37 (1978). In one concur-
ring opinion, Justice Brennan noted that Korematsu and the Supreme Court’s 1943 decision in Hira-
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early ancestor of modern strict scrutiny, Korematsu was well positioned to play a 
foundational role in constitutional law. But its role was not as significant as that 
of The Chinese Exclusion Case, which established the federal government’s very 
power to regulate immigration. This difference may help explain the divergence 
of Korematsu’s trajectory and the Court’s repudiation of it in Trump v. Hawaii. 
b. Consistency with Then-Contemporary Cultural and Legal Norms 
Scholars have exhaustively analyzed the racism that underlay Korematsu 
and the executive order at issue in the case.340 That racism was consistent with 
long time cultural norms that intensified during the World War II era. In 1944, 
when the Supreme Court decided Korematsu, segregation of and discrimina-
tion against racial and ethnic minorities was pervasive.341 After Japan’s attack 
on Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans became the focus of suspicion and bla-
tant discrimination that manifested itself in art, cartoons, magazine articles, 
propaganda, exclusions from educational institutions, and violence.342 The law 
mirrored these racist attitudes in its intolerance of Asians more generally. It 
was not until 1943 that Congress ended Chinese exclusion era immigration 
policies that barred entry into the united States and prohibited naturalization of 
persons of Chinese ancestry.343 But existing national origin and race based 
immigration laws ensured that very few Chinese immigrants could enter even 
after the repeal of Chinese exclusion laws.344 It would be decades before the 
                                                                                                                           
bayashi v. United States are cases generally thought to establish strict scrutiny. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358 
n.34 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 340 Craig Green, Ending the Korematsu Era: An Early View from the War on Terror Cases, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 983 (2011) (discussing and cataloguing scholarship that focuses on the impact of race-
based discrimination in Korematsu and offering an alternative analysis of Korematsu that focuses on 
the then-contemporary view of executive authority rather than race). 
 341 See Pamela J. Smith, Our Children’s Burden: The Many-Headed Hydra of the Educational 
Disenfranchisement of Black Children, 42 HOW. L.J. 133, 166 (1999) (describing attitudes toward 
segregation in the South during the 1940s); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War 
Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 70–73 (1988) (describing World War II segregation in the work-
place, the military, housing, and more). 
 342 See, e.g., Nancy Brcak & John R. Pavia, Racism in Japanese and U.S. Wartime Propaganda, 
56 HISTORIAN 671 (1994); Eric Langowski, Education Denied: Indiana University’s Japanese Ameri-
can Ban, 1942 to 1945, 115 IND. MAG. HIST. 65 (2019); How to Tell Japs from the Chinese, LIFE 
MAG., Dec. 22, 1941, at 81, 81–82; Wang Xiaofei, Movies Without Mercy: Race, War, and Images of 
Japanese People in American Films, 1942–1945, 18 J. AM.-E. ASIAN RELATIONS 11 (2011). 
 343 Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
 344 See id. The National Origins Act limited immigration from each country based on the percent-
age of the total U.S. population from that country as of a particular year. This was meant to preserve 
the mostly white racial makeup of the United States. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 
153. 
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quotas, which resulted in very low immigration from China and Asia generally, 
were replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.345 
Furthermore, the rationale of protecting the American public from espio-
nage that the Court used to justify detaining Japanese Americans in Korematsu 
was prevalent in American culture during the late 1940s and 1950s as McCar-
thyism spread across the country.346 Executive orders and congressional acts to 
screen communists out of federal employment and to protect the nation from 
communist conspiracy were in place well into the 1950s.347 
c. Passage of Time 
It is with respect to this factor—the passage of time—that The Chinese 
Exclusion Case and Korematsu differ most. The Chinese Exclusion Case has 
lived over 130 years. Korematsu, in comparison, is still young, with just seventy-
six years on the books. Sixty years ago, when The Chinese Exclusion Case was 
at the same point in its trajectory that Korematsu is now, the 1889 Supreme 
Court case Chae Chan Ping v. United States was still being cited positively.348 
Korematsu, however, had already begun to make appearances in anticanon lists 
and to be negatively described in the 1980s and 1990s.349 The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, in the meantime, was falling off the judicial radar, and the Court’s silence 
with respect to it may have insulated it from ever being reviewed. 
                                                                                                                           
 345 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-263, 79 Stat. 911 (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
 346 The beginning of the Cold War brought fear and apprehension about communism. John Glaser & 
Christopher A. Preble, High Anxiety: How Washington’s Exaggerated Sense of Danger Harms Us All, 
CATO INST. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.cato.org/study/high-anxiety-how-washingtons-exaggerated-
sense-danger-harms-us-all#introduction [https://perma.cc/Z3V5-8QX7]. 
 347 See, e.g., Communist Control Act of 1954, ch. 886, 68 Stat. 775 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 841–844); Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947). 
 348 See, e.g., Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 96 
(1961) (citing to The Chinese Exclusion Case while upholding a mandatory registration requirement 
for Communist Party members); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 698–99, 699 n.9 (1958) (citing to 
The Chinese Exclusion Case to support the government’s ability to exclude “resident alien[s]” who 
left the country from returning based on past or current Communist Party memberships); Reid v. Cov-
ert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 n.34 (1957) (citing to The Chinese Exclusion Case to support the proposition that a 
treaty is entitled to the same weight as federal legislation). 
 349 See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, supra note 247, at 1018 
(describing Korematsu as anticanonical in a 1998 article); Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of 
Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 77–78 
(1996) (noting that “[s]ince the 1980s, various individuals, groups, and courts have pronounced Ko-
rematsu insignificant . . . . [but] the [Supreme] Court has not explicitly overruled it”). 
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B. Buck v. Bell 
In Buck, the Supreme Court upheld forced sterilization under Virginia 
law.350 This case provides a contrast to Korematsu and The Chinese Exclusion 
Case. Like Korematsu and The Chinese Exclusion Case, Buck has been signif-
icantly weakened by an accumulation of dark matter. But Buck is not likely to 
be revived or revisited. Unlike the other two cases examined in this Article, 
Buck plays no foundational role in any area of law and was not obviously con-
sistent with contemporaneous legal norms. Here, I very briefly describe the 
case, reference evidence of the dark matter that surrounds it, and explain the 
distinction between Buck, on the one hand, and Korematsu and The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, on the other.351 
Carrie Buck, whose mother had been committed to an institution for the 
“feeble minded,” had likewise been institutionalized for “feeblemindedness” at 
the age of seventeen after giving birth to a baby out of wedlock.352 When so-
cial workers examined the baby, named Vivian, they concluded that she too 
was at risk, noting, “[T]here is a look about it that is not quite normal.”353 
Buck was subsequently surgically sterilized, presumably to prevent her from 
having additional “feebleminded” children. 
Buck claimed that this sterilization violated her Fourteenth Amendment 
right to equal protection and due process, and she took the case to the Supreme 
Court.354 In 1927, the Court rejected Buck’s argument and upheld the Virginia 
law.355 The result of this case is undoubtedly shocking to the modern reader, 
but Justice Holmes’s logic may be more so: 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degener-
ate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, so-
ciety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing 
their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is 
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations 
of imbeciles are enough.356 
                                                                                                                           
 350 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 351 See infra notes 352–386 and accompanying text. 
 352 Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. Further research uncovered that Buck was not in fact mentally ill but 
that she had been raped by her foster parents’ nephew. The family put her in the mental institution in 
order to blame a mental condition instead of taking the fault and accompanying consequences. See 
Alessandra Suuberg, Buck v. Bell, American Eugenics, and the Bad Man Test: Putting Limits on 
Newgenics in the 21st Century, 38 LAW & INEQ.: J. THEORY & PRAC. 115, 121 (2020). 
 353 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 2 (2014); Stephen Jay 
Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 337 (1985). 
 354 Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. 
 355 Id. 
 356 Id. at 207 (citation omitted). 
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This case provides an example of dark matter operating outside the immigra-
tion context. In subsection 1 below I discuss the dark matter surrounding 
Buck.357 Subsection 2 compares the way dark matter has played out differently 
with Buck than with The Chinese Exclusion Case.358 
1. Dark Matter Surrounding Buck v. Bell 
Like Korematsu and The Chinese Exclusion Case, scholars have univer-
sally rejected Buck,359 judges have avoided and reimagined it (as described 
below), and everyone else has largely forgotten it. But Buck has never been 
formally overturned. Justice Thomas most recently cited Buck as a lamentable 
moment in Supreme Court history in which the Court gave legitimacy to the eu-
genics movement. He called on the Court to address its history: “Although the 
Court declines to wade into these issues today, we cannot avoid them forev-
er.”360 
Avoidance is, indeed, a fair characterization of the Court’s treatment of 
Buck. As early as 1942, just fifteen years after Buck was decided, the Court 
distanced itself from its own holding. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court again 
addressed the issue of forced sterilization.361 In this case, the court ruled the 
forced punitive sterilization of prison inmates unconstitutional while leaving 
the Buck precedent intact.362 Justice Douglas’s opinion uneasily navigated 
Buck—he recognized its existence and its significance while asserting that the 
case at hand was distinct.363 
Buck later appeared in Supreme Court opinions during the 1970s as sup-
port for more general propositions. In this reimagining, the Court cited Buck as 
an example of a state being able to legally place restrictions on privacy,364 a 
state having the interest to protect its citizens,365 and the changing standard of 
equal protection.366 
                                                                                                                           
 357 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 358 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 359 See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Supreme 
Court Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1032 (2016) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court’s 1927 
decision in Buck v. Bell is widely reviled and has been relegated to the Supreme Court “hall of 
shame”); Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a Lost World, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 101, 102 (2011) (describing the tragic nature of Buck and contending that it was not just a moral-
ly reprehensible decision, but also was legally erroneous). 
 360 Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1793 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (per curiam). 
 361 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 362 Id. 
 363 Id. at 544–45 (distinguishing Bell because it involved an inheritable trait, unlike the case at 
hand). 
 364 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 365 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 366 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978). 
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The last time the Court cited Buck in a majority opinion was in its 2001 
case Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.367 There, the 
claimants raised challenges to employer conduct under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).368 The majority merely mentioned Buck in a footnote 
to recognize that the Court had previously held that harsh measures may be 
legal, but also noted that states no longer use such harsh measures.369 In many 
ways, this virtually insignificant footnote evidences the difficulty of addressing 
ordinary matter that is surrounded by dark matter—Buck remains, but the con-
text in which it arose is largely gone. 
In 2004, Justice Souter cited Buck in his Tennessee v. Lane concurring 
opinion.370 There, the plaintiffs had alleged a violation of Title II of the ADA 
because they were denied access to the state courthouse.371 Justice Souter re-
ferred to Buck as an unpalatable relic of times past372 and distinguished the 
case at hand from Buck.373 Most recently in 2019, Justice Thomas cited Buck 
in a concurrence to a case discussing the possible eugenic uses of abortion.374 
As mentioned above, Justice Thomas did not address the actual issue of 
whether eugenic abortions were allowed but rather urged the Court to consider 
the role of eugenics, a subject that it has avoided since Buck.375 
2. Buck v. Bell’s Diverging Trajectory 
Justice Thomas’s statement accurately observes the challenge of overturn-
ing precedent that lurks under dark matter. However, Buck is less likely than The 
Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu (before Trump v. Hawaii) to resurface in 
any meaningful way. Unlike The Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu, Buck 
does not have the benefit of playing a foundational role in any area of law.376 
Neither is it obviously in line with the prevailing sentiments and cultural norms 
of its time.377 I explore these factors in more detail below. Subsection a discusses 
Buck’s relatively inconsequential role in the development of law.378 Subsection b 
                                                                                                                           
 367 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. at 369 n.6. 
 370 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 534 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 371 Id. at 513 (majority opinion). 
 372 Id. at 534 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 373 Id. 
 374 Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (per curiam). 
 375 Id. at 1793. 
 376 See 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 377 See infra notes 382–386 and accompanying text. 
 378 See infra Part IV.B.2.a. 
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analyzes whether the case aligned with norms at the time of the decision.379 
Lastly, subsection c explores the effect of passage of time since Buck.380 
a. Foundational Role 
The fact that courts cite Buck for propositions that vary widely from case 
to case suggests that Buck has not come to represent any particular foundation-
al proposition. Rather, it is known for its specific facts and for its jarring de-
scription of Buck. Indeed, it is hard to find any meaningful legal doctrine in 
Buck at all. It is merely five paragraphs long, the majority of which is devoted 
to a restatement of facts and procedural history and a defense of eugenics more 
generally.381 
b. Consistency with Then-Contemporary Cultural and Legal Norms 
Additionally, it is unclear that Buck’s holding was consistent with widely 
accepted cultural norms of the day. Though the eugenics movement was gain-
ing steam at the time, experts hotly disputed the legitimacy and desirability of 
eugenics.382 Proponents argued that by controlling human reproduction, the 
human race could be improved, while critics questioned the science and moti-
vation behind those claims.383 Many state courts had already found eugenic 
sterilization unconstitutional384 or had entirely denounced the movement.385 
Cultural norms that supported forced sterilization were, for the most part, short 
lived and fleeting as the eugenics movement became associated with percep-
tions of Nazi Germany.386 
                                                                                                                           
 379 See infra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 380 See infra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 381 See Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–08. 
 382 Michelle Oberman, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned by Paul 
Lombardo’s Three Generations, No Imbeciles, 59 J. LEG. EDUC. 357, 359 (2009); see also Edward J. 
Larson, Anti-canonical Considerations, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (noting that “in 1927, eugenics 
was on the rise”). 
 383 Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of 
American Law, 1900–1930, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 63, 63–67 (1998). Today, the discriminatory objec-
tives and results of the eugenics movement are well recognized. See Gregory Michael Dorr, Princi-
pled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 
(1998); Note, Regulating Eugenics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1582 (2008) (“The eugenics of the first 
half of the twentieth century is rightly considered abhorrent. Couched in faux scientific language, 
eugenics policies were at bottom motivated more by racism, classism, and colonial subjugation than 
by any real concern for genetic fitness.”). 
 384 Larson, supra note 382, at 5. 
 385 Nourse, supra note 359, at 103. 
 386 Maura McIntyre, Note, Buck v. Bell and Beyond: A Revised Standard to Evaluate the Best 
Interests of the Mentally Disabled in the Sterilization Context, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1303, 1308. 
Forced sterilization of Native American women, however, continued into the 1970s. 1976: Govern-
ment Admits Unauthorized Sterilization of Indian Women, NAT’L LIBR. MED.: NATIVE VOICES, 
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c. Passage of Time 
Buck is almost one hundred years old, and almost fifty years have passed 
since a court relied on it for a decision. The length of time Buck has remained 
on the books without being reaffirmed, in conjunction with its lack of any 
foundational role and its inconsistency with then-contemporaneous cultural 
norms, severely reduces the chances that Buck will play any meaningful role in 
the future development of the law. Unlike The Chinese Exclusion Case and 
Korematsu, Buck is likely to disappear from memory except to the extent that 
that scholars and judges continue to use it as an example of decision-making 
gone awry. Of course, nothing is guaranteed. As described below, dark matter 
does not eliminate ordinary matter; rather, it can constrain behavior in a way 
that prevents legal actors from relying on ordinary matter. Whether ordinary 
matter has any power depends entirely on the extent to which legal actors feel 
constrained by dark matter. 
V. DARK MATTER’S EFFECT ACROSS BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 
Dark matter can constrain the behavior of some legal actors more than 
others. Below, in Section A, I describe the factors that may result in dark mat-
ter constraining legislative branch actors in more significant ways than it does 
other legal actors.387 In Section B, I discuss how dark matter limits the judici-
ary. Finally, in Section C, I describe the reasons for which executive branch 
actors may be the least constrained of all the branches by dark matter.388 
A. Legislative Branch 
Dark matter likely asserts the greatest pull and binding power on legisla-
tures, primarily as a function of a legislative body’s aggregative dynamic. 
Many people must agree to the enactment of any piece of legislation.389 Where 
significant dark matter has accumulated, it is unlikely that there will be indi-
viduals who wield enough influence over legislation to outweigh the more 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nativevoices/timeline/543.html [https://perma.cc/4XVD-577E] (noting that 
“3,406 American Indian women [were sterilized] without their permission between 1973 and 1976”). 
 387 See infra Part V.A. 
 388 See infra Part V.B. 
 389 CHARLES B. CUSHMAN JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 61 (2006) (“Bills 
earning a majority of votes on the floor can go to the Senate for its consideration.”); see WALTER J. 
OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 421 (9th ed. 2014) (observing 
three preconditions for a bill becoming a law, all requiring that many people be in agreeance: “First, a 
member makes a bill a top priority and is willing to expend the time and effort to build sufficient sup-
port to guarantee its passage. Second, a large group of constituents in multiple jurisdictions make 
passing a bill more politically attractive than doing nothing. Third, Congress is forced to respond to an 
event so tragic or compelling that the event itself overwhelms all possible criticism.” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Senator Orrin Hatch)). 
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generalized recognition of that dark matter among other legislators. This is 
simply a matter of probabilities: if there is a general sense that rounding up 
people of a certain race and incarcerating them is illegal, then there are not 
likely many people on a legislature that have a contrary view.390 In a majoritar-
ian legislative process, minority opinions have little ultimate influence.391 
In addition, legislators are subject to re-election every few years. Many 
have the opportunity to stay in office indefinitely, both in the United States 
Congress and in many state legislatures. The electoral process and opportunity 
for continued tenure in office can discourage legislators from supporting legis-
lation that the majority of constituents would understand as inappropriate, in-
tolerable, or even contrary to superseding (constitutional) law.392 
B. Judicial Branch 
Courts are quite constrained by dark matter, too. Like legislatures, the 
structure of the U.S. judicial system includes an aggregative process in that a 
single judge’s opinion is not necessarily determinative. The fact that decisions 
can be appealed, often to panels of judges, means that even a judge with an 
outlying opinion (one that does not recognize the weight of dark matter) will 
not have the final say.393 This is certainly true of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
where any given case may be heard by up to nine Justices. Dark matter con-
strains U.S. courts, however, somewhat less than legislatures because courts 
are more bound to ordinary matter than lawmaking bodies.394 When legisla-
                                                                                                                           
 390 This is because the legislature, especially the House, was specifically designed “to reflect the 
interests of [the representatives’] constituents.” CUSHMAN, supra note 389, at 48. 
 391 See Keith Krehbiel et al., A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking, 3 POL. SCI. RSCH. & 
METHODS 423, 424 (2015) (“[T]he minority party is neither seen nor heard, and the majority party is 
the big winner.”); Alan E. Wiseman & John R. Wright, The Legislative Median and Partisan Policy, 
20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 5 (2008) (“[I]n the event that the majority party organization exerts no 
influence over the legislative process, and in the event that all policies then default to the legislative 
median, policy outcomes will still substantially favor the majority party over the minority.”). 
 392 Some literature, however, suggests that the election process may actually bias outcomes in 
favor of more extreme candidates in certain situations. See David W. Brady et al., Primary Elections 
and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 79, 80 (2007) 
(“[P]rimary constituencies tend to favor more-extreme candidates than do general-election constituen-
cies . . . .”). But see Andrew B. Hall & Daniel M. Thompson, Who Punishes Extremist Nominees? 
Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in US Elections, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 509, 509 
(2018) (“Combining a regression discontinuity design in close primary races with survey and adminis-
trative data on individual voter turnout, we find that extremist nominees—as measured by the mix of 
campaign contributions they receive—suffer electorally, largely because they decrease their party’s 
share of turnout in the general election, skewing the electorate towards their opponent’s party.”). 
 393 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation 
at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1033 (2007) (“Appellate judges, when interviewed, 
maintain that they seek to reach consensus even if it means compromising on their own view of how a 
case should be decided.”). 
 394 See Timothy R. Johnson, The Supreme Court Decision Making Process, in OXFORD RE-
SEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA: POLITICS (2016), http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/978019
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tures act, they can overwrite any ordinary matter of law, except for constitu-
tional provisions.395 They can also avoid legislating in an area that they per-
ceive to already be adequately regulated by dark matter.396 
Courts, however, must account for the ordinary matter of law—precedents 
and statutes in their decision-making.397 Dark matter may, of course, influence 
their interpretation of that ordinary matter, but they are not free to ignore it. In 
addition, courts have little choice regarding the cases that come before them. 
Although legislatures may simply decide not to take up an issue for legislation, 
courts cannot ignore a case that is before them.398 Once again, dark matter may 
affect the way a court decides a case, but where dark matter has not con-
strained ex ante the situation that gave rise to the case, a court must either ig-
nore, dismiss, or give voice to that dark matter. When it ignores or dismisses 
dark matter, a court weakens it. 
C. Executive Branch 
The least constrained legal actors are likely those in the executive branch 
of government. This is not to say that they are unconstrained by dark matter. 
To the contrary, as illustrated by the example of President Trump turning to 
advisers for advice on how to implement a “Muslim ban,” legal, dark matter 
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precedent is an informal norm, but the Court must also follow certain formal rules such as those set 
out in the Constitution. Because the Constitution gives Congress the power to override Supreme Court 
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 395 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. VI, cl. 3; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 
135 (1810) (acknowledging that “one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legis-
lature was competent to pass; and one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legisla-
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 396 See Michael J. Teter, Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional Stalemate, 48 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (2011) (discussing how Congress overcomes congressional gridlock via 
“recusal legislating” and how “Congress recognizes that its own structural weaknesses prevent mean-
ingful action on an issue on which there is policy consensus” and thus employs recusal legislation “as 
a means for overcoming the institutional or political hurdles that often seem to prevent the passage of 
important legislation”). 
 397 Johnson, supra note 394 (“[I]f the Court frequently ignored its own legal precedents its credi-
bility as a judicial institution might be questioned, and it could potentially lose legitimacy—its main 
source of power.”); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 
1029 (1996) (“[A] norm favoring precedent is a fundamental feature of the general conception of the 
function of the Supreme Court in society at large. To the extent that compliance with this norm is 
necessary to maintain the fundamental legitimacy of the Supreme Court, such a belief will constrain 
the justices from deviating from precedent in a regular and systematic way.”). 
 398 See FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 41 (providing in two separate rules how a party commences an action, 
and also only allowing dismissal if a party files for it); FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (stating that a judge must 
issue a warrant for arrest when probable cause exists that a crime was committed). 
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also affects the executive branch. But the nature of the executive branch of 
government, which often carries out the decisions and priorities of a single 
person rather than aggregating those of multiple decision-makers, results in a 
higher probability of an individual’s idiosyncratic understanding of the law, 
rather than a more generalized shared understanding, affecting policy.399 
This very concern may have partially motivated Justice Kagan’s question 
during oral arguments in Trump v. Hawaii.400 She described a hypothetical 
“out-of-the-box kind of president” who had expressed vehement anti-Semitic 
views prior to taking office.401 She asked whether prior statements could be 
considered to determine that an eventual ban on entry of travelers from Israel 
was based on religion, even if the ban language did not mention religion.402 By 
characterizing the hypothetical president as “out-of-the-box,” Justice Kagan 
recognized that it would only take one legal actor who felt less constrained by 
dark matter norms to revive or give voice to norms repudiated long ago. 
This discrepancy in the way that dark matter constrains legal actors in the 
three branches of government raises challenging questions for the examples of 
dark matter discussed here. Is dark matter enough to prevent another enact-
ment of race-based immigration legislation, for example? Can we rely on a 
generalized and shared understanding? Or does this reliance risk the unearth-
ing and thawing of The Chinese Exclusion Case? 
CONCLUSION 
Dark matter in the law poses a fascinating and potentially problematic 
tension. On the one hand, the development of dark matter allows the law to 
develop and progress without revisiting the ordinary matter of law. As actors 
become constrained by dark matter, the relevancy of the ordinary matter, even 
if more permissive, wanes. On the other hand, dark matter does not formally 
eliminate ordinary matter; it lurks beneath the veil of dark matter, ready to be 
invoked by Justice Kagan’s hypothetical “out-of-the-box kind of president” or 
another legal actor over whom dark matter exerts less pull. This is not merely a 
theoretical risk. President Trump’s initial plan for a travel ban based on reli-
gion is a prime example of such a risk materializing. More recently, reports 
have surfaced that women held in an immigration detention center were steri-
lized without their consent, echoing the sentiments that gave rise to the Court’s 
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1927 decision Buck v. Bell.403 The increasing anti-Asian sentiment in the Unit-
ed States during the COVID-19 pandemic threatens some of the same commu-
nities targeted during the Chinese exclusion and Japanese internment eras.404 
The question, then, is whether and how to address court precedents like 
the ones examined in this Article when they are obscured by dark matter. I 
have provided some factors above that might help determine when dark matter 
alone is sufficient to guard against revival of a precedent. Buck, for example, 
may be sufficiently abandoned even if not formally overturned, but there is no 
guarantee. In the case of court precedent, U.S. legal structures prevent courts 
from addressing and overturning cases that are not raised in a live controversy 
before them. Chief Justice Roberts, perhaps recognizing this tension, took an 
opportunity in 2018 in Trump v. Hawaii to reject the holding of the 1944 Su-
preme Court case Korematsu v. United States, even though Korematsu, as he 
wrote, was not implicated in Trump v. Hawaii.405 Perhaps it is time to similarly 
reject The Chinese Exclusion Case, precisely because it might resurface in to-
day’s political climate. Without a formal overturning of The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, we cannot close a chapter of history that, although obscured and perhaps 
shielded by dark matter, serves as the foundation of the observable constitu-
tional immigration universe. 
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